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The insider threat is a global problem that impacts organizations and produces a gamut of
undesired outcomes. Businesses often experience lost revenue and stolen trade secrets,
which can leave a tarnished reputation. Insider threats can also cause harm to individuals
and national security.
Past efforts have not mitigated the problem in its entirety. Documented instances of
insider threats are as recent as March 2020. Many researchers have focused on
monitoring technologies and relying on human monitoring in a reactive posture. An ideal
solution would scrutinize an individual’s character and ascertain whether unique traits
associated with actors of insider threats are apparent within the preemployment vetting
process.
This study leveraged various input data streams and applied theory-driven behaviors that
are associated with fraudulent activities. The research followed a Design Science
Research (DSR) methodology to produce sentiment analysis of IT artifacts, and ranked
individuals’ level of trustworthiness, conducive within the hiring process.
Lab experiments were used to answer the research questions, provided valuable insight
with fraudulent activities, and discovered commonalities with negative sentiments found
in social media tweets. First, literature was defined and reviewed to address mitigation of
insider threats in one form or another. Second, artifacts were from the sum of all data
components; these artifacts proved to be informative during the construction within each
lab experiment. Finally, the lab experiments provided helpful contributions to the study.
For instance, across all lab experiments, common themes emerged from four negative
sentiment scores. These scores were later illustrated under the S140-negScore, AFINNnegScore, SentiWordnet-negScore, and NRC-Hash-Sent-negScore. Behavioral theories
did not always appear within each artifact; however, the routine activity theory was the
most prevalent and was detailed in the lab experiments.
The research extends previous and relevant research, thus leveraging social inputs and
fraudulent data extracted from the legal system as a foundation for a way forward. An
insider threat can be mitigated through leveraging social media data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Insider threats pose significant security risks within organizations; this specific
threat is nothing new. The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (2015) defines
insider threats as follows:
The threat presented by a person who has, or once had, authorized access to
information, facilities, networks, people, or resources; and who wittingly, or
unwittingly, commits: acts in contravention of law or policy that resulted in, or
might result in, harm through the loss or degradation of government or company
information, resources, or capabilities; or destructive acts, to include physical
harm to others in the workplace. (para. 3)
Organizations place focus on monitoring solutions and appear to operate
reactively. Proactive approaches to security may be more beneficial than reactive
approaches (Hunker & Probst, 2011). Statistics have captured reported instances of
insider threats; however, some cases are not reported due to ethical laws and sanctions
issued by the government (Oladimeji, Ayo, & Adewumi, 2019).
To this end, this dissertation study does not represent an end-all solution to insider
threat mitigation. Instead, it addressed why past attempts to mitigate insider threats have
failed and provided an alternative approach to alleviate the problem by leveraging data
from social platforms. Organizational leaders could ascertain whether an individual might
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be considered a security threat at the earliest onset and before employment within this
context.
Problem Statement
Insider threats are a problem. Powers’ (2017) brief literature review documented a
case of an insider threat in the financial sector in 1792. Other forms of insider threats
dated back to 41 A.D.
This dissertation study’s review of relevant literature revealed various avenues
and approaches to standard practices to address insider threat mitigation efforts; however,
the literature fell short of effectively addressing the problem. Organizations have invested
heavily in deterrence monitoring tools to observe employees’ activities, such as computer
access, Internet browsing, and e-mail communications (Alahmadi, Legg, & Nurse, 2015),
yet requires monitoring resources, and can become an ineffective strategy. According to
Loffi and Wallace (2014), employee monitoring for insider threat activities should be
used cautiously with concerns for lapses in enthusiasm and suspicion of leadership.
To further combat the insider threats, Cole (2015) suggested that organizations
implement administrative policies, procedures, Internet audits, workforce monitoring,
whistleblower incentives, and put strategies in place for data loss prevention. Individuals
who cause insider threats are aware of the policies, procedures, and technology used in
their organizations and are often also aware of the organization’s vulnerabilities
(Cappelli, Moore, Trzeciak, & Shimeall, 2009). Auditing can also impact policy
enforcement. Auditing often results in redundant, misleading, and missing data; even
worse, audit trails typically lack time correlation (Hunker & Probst, 2011).
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Effective information security cannot be delivered only by perfecting the
effectiveness of technical controls (Ismail & Yusof, 2018) and goes beyond technological
aspects. Attempts to mitigate an insider threat that is solely based on technology could
fail and operates during or after a threat. Methodologies of the past had weaknesses,
exploitable flaws, and demonstrate a need to foster new approaches.
This dissertation study leveraged an additional source of data to supplement
existing mitigation efforts. As outlined in the research process, the IT artifact creation
(see Figure 1) included information collected through fraudulent legal cases. In these
instances, the social components from fraud was leveraged to provide a better
understanding of the cohesion within social media data (with permission of the author).

Figure 1. Modified IT artifact. Reprinted from “Considering the social impacts of
artefacts in information systems design science research” by G. De Leoz and S. Petter,
2018, European Journal of Information Systems, 27(2), 154–170. Copyright 2018 by
Taylor and Francis. Adapted with permission.
Many types of insider threat classifications must be considered. Shaw, Ruby, and
Post (1998) pointed out vulnerabilities associated with introversion, computer
dependency, social and personal frustrations, ethics, entitlement, lack of empathy, and
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reduced loyalty. The classifications can become exhaustive; therefore, the focus of this
study was related to generalized fraudulent activities through court transcripts.
Court transcripts with cases involving forms of fraud, illuminated schemes, and
tactics used in carrying out crimes and shows relevance to this study’s interpretation with
behavioral theories. For example, a corrupt security executive’s scheme included giving
himself his regular paycheck, then later would write a second paycheck, a forged check
(Glackin & Bible, 2019). The case blatantly lists the defendant’s fraudulent behaviors
through multiple counts of felony theft and forgery. In this instance, information on fraud
is also illustrated through court documentation and appears to be a great source for
supportive information.
While an initial assessment into insider threats is understood, ways with dealing
with the threat appears to remain a serious problem worth solving. Data collections from
various sources can hold the key to detecting the threat from much earlier in the
mitigation cycle. The integration of innovative data collections from the courts, analysis
of social media data, and applying the behavioral theories can provide a clear picture to
represent possible insider threat characteristics.
One could postulate that data extracted specifically from prosecuted cases
involving various forms of fraud can show relevancy to different behavioral theories and
reveal correlations to social media posts that exhibit specific negative sentiment within
comments, messages, or user-posted content. It is not guaranteed that one will find
consistent matches of sentiments; however, it is possible to use machine learning and
arrive at a probable outcome.
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After reviewing what has already been done, the problem remains. Extending
research by Park, You, and Lee (2018), appears to offer new light when integrating
negative sentiments from fraudulent data and into the context with social media. The
added value obtained from leveraging legal documents provides useful information in
identifying threats. For instance, data supporting the research was achieved through
leveraging top website outlets, such as sites reviewed by PracticaleCommerce (2017),
and included access to twenty-thousand Twitter tweets. Additionally, court transcripts
came from several jurisdictions around the country and accounted for approximately 138
pages from legal documents.
This dissertation study sought two types of data. First, accessing social input
tweets from Twitter provided insight into social contexts. Insiders have shared common
characteristics, and the extraction of these attributes through social media is feasible
(Gritzalis, Stavrou, Kandias, & Stergiopoulos, 2014). Tweets have varying types of
content. The following are starting points for capturing content:
•

Date

•

Time

•

Source

•

Favorites

•

Retweets

•

Replies

•

Quotes

•

Language

•

Tweet types
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•

Text

•

Quote

•

Country

•

Place

•

Latitude

•

Longitude

Second, the need to access court transcripts included a preliminary search for a
suitable tool and led to the Public Access to Courts Electronic Records (PACER) website.
PACER provides case information from the eastern District of Virginia, including
Albemarle, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties (USCourts.gov., 2019).
Moreover, the Loudoun County General District Court (LCGDC) offered public
computer access and made cases available. S. Shifflett from the LCGDC office stated that
the LCGDC database allows researchers the ability to view most filings and then
determine any required documents (personal communications, August 23, 2019).
In addition, questions from the prosecuting counsel and the defendant’s replies to
counsel are intentionally omitted. This dissertation study needed a preview of case
information to understand what information was available, which required an in-person
visit to LCGDC, and sought the following preliminary types of information.
•

Prosecutor’s questions

•

Defendant’s responses to questions from prosecuting attorneys

•

Plea agreement(s)

•

Arraignment

•

Complaint
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•

Filing

•

Probation

•

Readiness

•

Sentencing

Social media inputs and court transcripts provide insight into an individual’s
character. Furthermore, social network data is beneficial for detecting threats at a much
earlier stage (Kauh et al., 2017); thus, social network data became a factor leveraged in
this research. Park et al. (2018) found practicality in social media analysis. Albeit, this
study used contrasting data to find negative emotions in support of discovering insider
threats, with emphasis placed upon preemployment vetting.
While the preceding works by Kauh et al.’s (2017) offered promise, attempts to
prevent an insider threat appeared to leave room for improvement. The research intent
extends similar works by Park, You, and Lee (2018) in broadening social media
sentiment analysis to include additional data sources that show relevancy to the Routine
Activity Theory (RAT). More importantly, fraudulent case data contained lexicons with
correlations to various forms of fraud are sought after within social inputs. Emphasis was
placed on early detection, as it is nearly impossible to stop the insider right before the
incident; hence the best solution is to prevent the threats from occurring through early
detection (Soh, Yu, Narayanan, Duraisamy, & Chen, 2019).
This dissertation study used a revised approach and warranted an in-depth
screening of individuals’ online activities to determine each individual’s level of
trustworthiness. The idea was to provide another tool to be used in a rounded approach to
mitigate an organizational threat during the employment vetting process.
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Dissertation Goal
The study’s goal is to explore the various theories (Table 1), show which relates
to fraudulent cases, examine social media data streams, and examine correlations through
machine learning of sentiment analysis. Supportive behavioral theories provide another
mechanism to supplement a well-rounded approach in predicting an insider threat. Just as
court transcripts offered a wealth of information with specific fraud traits, social media
content is another instrumental source of data used to assess an individual’s character.
According to Kandias, Stavrou, Bozovic, and Gritzalis (2013), when employees exhibit
antisocial and negative views of law enforcement and those in authority, they become
more likely to act against an organization; traits are becoming increasingly important
when attempting to identify an insider threat.
Inputs from social media can fill a gap with applicants not being forthcoming with
certain information and can potentially decrease their realistic or imagined chances of
employment (Jeske, Lippke, & Shultz, 2019). Analogous to this study are the efforts
conducted for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The agency sought a
contract to build an “extreme” vetting system that would analyze social media posts
(Duarte, Llanso, & Loup, 2018) and demonstrated a desire to do more with mitigation.
Table 1
Referenced Theories
Theory

Reference

General deterrence theory

GDT

Protection motivation theory

PMT

Routine activity theory

RAT

Social bond theory

SBT

Theory of planned behavior

TRB

Theory of reasoned action

TRA
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Leveraging social media content is nothing new. Eighty-six percent of employers
screen prospective employees’ social media content (Berski, 2016), whereas others
validate information provided on a résumé (Carpenter, 2017). Furthermore, social media
checks are becoming increasingly important and should be pursued (Kühn & Nieman,
2017).
This study focused on the earliest phase of the preemployment vetting process,
beyond a manual intervention of viewing profiles and résumés. The model for this
research led to a theoretical framework that included information from social inputs and
publicly available court transcripts from prosecuted fraud cases.
The usage of court data, applying theories addressing behavioral norms, and
social media inputs produced an attainable concept to promote and support a mitigation
effort. Data supporting the research were available through the court systems and through
diverse website outlets, such as sites reviewed by Mehra (2017) and access to thousands
of users in social media.
Park, You, and Lee (2018) shared a similar purpose with research leveraging
social inputs to focus on individual behaviors when examined through social content.
Moreover, changes in behavior or mindset and attitude are often displayed either before
or during the insider act being committed (Bell, Rogers, & Pearce, 2019). Analyzing
social inputs presented itself as an effective use of data, provided in-depth insight into
improving the vetting process, and ultimately allows organizations another tool to help
prevent the selection of anyone likely to position themselves as an insider threat.
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Research Questions
This dissertation study formulated the research questions to address whether or
not the usability of behavioral theories, fraudulent court transcripts, and social media
inputs could be leveraged as tools used within the preemployment hiring process. The
following research questions directly correlated to the design science research’s (DSR)
artifact process, which involves categorizing each question into either a social
component, a technical component, or both.
RQ1: Is there sufficient literature on insider threat mitigation strategies?
(Technical component).
RQ2: Is there relevance in behavioral theories, court transcripts from fraudulent
cases, and social inputs that can solve the problem with the research? (Social
component).
RQ3: What behavioral theories are most applicable to the research? (Social
component).
RQ4: Can IT artifacts be created from the information obtained in behavioral
theories, from court transcripts of fraudulent cases, and social inputs?
(Technical component).
RQ5: Will each IT artifact yield favorable outcomes through lab experiments and
contribute to the goal of the study? (Technical component)
Relevance and Significance
The markets most significantly impacted by insider threats include U.S. banking,
finance, information technology (IT), healthcare, government, and commercial facilities
(Williams, Levi, Burnap, & Gundur, 2018). Other likely outcomes beyond a monetary
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loss include serious harm to the organizations’ confidentiality or integrity (Krull, 2016),
embarrassment, legal fines, and loss of competitive advantage (Williams et al., 2018), to
exposure of customer data, trade secrets, or even leaking classified information.
Two highly documented cases in the intelligence community include Chelsea
Manning, who was convicted of stealing and disseminating 750,000 pages of documents
and videos to WikiLeaks (Jarrett & Borger, 2017), and Edward Snowden, the U.S.
National Security Agency contractor who leaked classified information in 2013 (Kühn &
Nieman, 2017). In both instances, leaks of classified information presented a significant
threat to national security.
There is a belief the problem of insider threats may exist due to a relaxed vetting
of individuals—such as current or former employees, contractors, or business partners
(Park, Lim, Kwon, & Choi, 2017)—who act outside the trust expectations that others in
the organization set (Costa, Albrethsen, & Collins, 2016). The sense of slackened
onboarding can supply a theoretical significance with the psychological reasoning to
answer questions centered around human behavior; thus, onboarding is a key aspect in
threat mitigations.
Moreover, the RAT states that criminal acts require convergence in space and
time of likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians against
crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979). For example, Williams et al. (2018) provided first-hand
evidence of the routine activities and guardianship that play a key factor in the likelihood
of insider threats. Many theories, such as the general deterrence theory and the theory of
planned behavior (TPB), provide an in-depth understanding of an individual’s intentions
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with information security compliance practices established by organizations (Flowerday
& Tuyikeze, 2016).
Integrating applicable behavioral theories to portions of this research is primarily
done through the researcher’s interpretations and observations extracted from fraudulent
case data and court reporting. The observations were taken from supporting documents
are taken through the researcher’s view and systematically sorting through the data to
find common themes (Creswell & Miller, 2000), relevant to the research conclusion, and
becomes a portion of the ending report. The preceding provided another aspect that
carried significant weight in understanding why insider threats occur and examined the
context in which the threats operate and shows relevancy to current-day organizational
threats.
The study results addressed insider threats at an earlier stage, making it feasible
for organizational leaders to mitigate attacks through the analysis of social inputs and
indicate the likelihood of an individual being a potential insider threat (Alahmadi et al.,
2015). Advanced recognition of a threat can become a tool that organizational leaders can
add to their comprehensive personnel vetting approach. Moreover, an effective defense
against insider threats is more of a result from a multipronged approach (Catrantzos,
2018), and not based on a single methodology.
Additionally, the research findings contribute to the body of knowledge through
additional analysis of social media content, which demonstrates a conducive direction for
detecting insider threats from an earlier position, and focused on how supplemental data
sources can add value to future research.
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Barriers and Issues
Several identified barriers and issues are attributed to data collection within the
context of gathering court transcripts. Although the initial gathering of court transcripts
came through the PACER system, knowing case numbers became a lengthy process.
According to USCourts.gov (2019), there are approximately 10,000,000 criminal cases
and filtering to a specific region can become a daunting task.
Due to the volume of available data, restrictions needed to be implemented during
the data collection phase, requires paralegal support, and support from the local
commonwealth attorneys. If paralegal support and support from the local commonwealth
attorneys remains an obstacle, legal counsel suggests not working with court transcripts
due to the volume of information; instead, researchers should use case notes or briefs of
cases from court reporters to alleviate the previous concerns (B. Gilliam, personal
communications, September 15, 2019). Court reporters must get permission to release
transcripts to anyone who is not a party or participant in the case. However, court
reporters need to get permission to release transcripts to anyone that is not a party or
participant in the case; it is not to say they cannot or would not (D. Linton, personal
communications, November 11, 2019) be available. According to Jaafari & Lewis
(2019), fourteen states have replaced court reporters with technology capable of capturing
audio and video.
After the court transcripts became available, additional speech to text conversion
software such as Bear File Converter, or a similar tool, played a crucial role in converting
the material. In addition, PDF files later required using iSkySoft to convert into text, and
later discussed with the lab experiments. The tools identified in the study required
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sufficient time to understand, which was best fitted for the tasks and capable of
performing sentiment analysis from various data streams. Some tools require conversions
of portable document format (PDF) documents into files that are compatible with the
other tools used within a study; thus, PDF-formatted documents and documents including
bitmap images create challenges during data extraction (Staar, Dolfi, Auer, & Bekas,
2018). Nevertheless, issues with document conversions are overcome through a rigorous
trial-and-error approach. The absence of electronic documents required converting hard
copies by scanning into a digital format.
Sufficient time and resources are needed and should be dedicated to the
preparation, test sampling, cleansing imbalanced data sets, and working to validate the
efficiency of planned techniques for dealing with the class imbalance problem in big data
sets (Krawczyk, 2016; Patil & Sonavane, 2017). The significance with imbalanced data is
voluminous, especially as social media data is growing with ever-increasing needs to
analyze large amounts of data to get useful insights (Kamburugamuve, Wickramasinghe,
Ekanayake, & Fox, 2018).
Furthermore, this research must account for the correction of imbalanced data
retrieved from social input from Twitter within the lab experiment portion of the DSR
methodology. In this instance, this dissertation study centered the data update around
limiting the number of records being processed, which was a constraint among some of
the study’s tools.
Lastly, due to the Coronavirus (COVID-19), visiting local jurisdictions often
required communicating in advance to verify hours of operation, following specific
protocols when entering office buildings, such as maintaining social distancing, and
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wearing personal protective equipment. Other means of communicating included
electronic mail and often required the need to be mindful of the different time zones,
especially when seeking prompt responses.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
The assumption with the study included the following. Collections of Internet data
would not become an arduous process. However, collecting data from public Internet
sites such as Twitter relies on general access from third-party tools, and obtaining access
presented itself with unique requirements. This dissertation study’s preliminary efforts
included uncovering the tools or vendors used in the study that currently had APIs to
support data retrieval. Twitter required a developer’s account and the company must vet
the application; unfortunately, time ran out while waiting for this process to complete.
Due to this obstacle, this dissertation study leveraged services through another vendor—
Vicinitas (2020)—to provide Twitter tweets.
An additional assumption was derived from the unknown amount of groundwork
that was needed during the gathering of documents. Document conversions can be
delayed until court transcripts are reviewed in-person. For instance, documents might
only be available in a printed format and not in the computer-readable format of PDF.
The required time to convert was an unknown factor, and the level of difficulty was
outlined in the barriers and issues’ section of this chapter.
Another area classified as a limitation came from the research using data written
in English and applied to sentiments, Twitter tweets, and court data. More than 3,600
interpreters are registered in the judiciary’s National Court Interpreter Database; these
interpreters cover 180 languages routinely used by the courts (USCourts.gov, 2017). This
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dissertation study did not want to add another layer of complexity involved in translations
within the court system. Facebook alone supports 111 diverse languages to its user base,
with Twitter promoting at least 33 languages (Fick & Dave, 2019). It is possible to
extend these works towards other languages; however, this was out of this study’s scope.
An initial assessment of delimitations is established by a finite number of artifacts
used in the study. Ideally, purposive sampling is used because it is a sample chosen “on
purpose” because those sampled meet specific criteria (Terrell, 2015) and correlated with
the number of fraud cases used in the research. Conversely, it was possible to extend the
delimitations into additional classification types of court cases, and present each artifact
with varying degrees of uniqueness that goes beyond fraud.
Definition of Terms
Big data - Collection of a very large amount of data (possibly in terabytes or even
bigger) being generated by numerous users all around the world via different instruments
and technologies (such as the web). It is difficult for technologies that process small
amounts of data to handle, process, analyze, capture, and visualize big data (Patil,
Kamdar, & Khatri, 2014).
Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes – According to Panda (2018), Discriminative
Multinomial Naïve Bayes is based on a Naïve Bayes variant with emphasis towards
characteristics of discriminative learning within text classifications.
Lexicon - A lexicon is a book containing an alphabetical arrangement of the words in a
language and their definitions (Merriam-Webster, 2020).
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Naïve Bayes - Naïve Bayes is a probabilistic based supervised learning algorithm that
uses Bayes rule together with a strong assumption that the attributes are conditionally
independent, given the class (Webb, 2010).
Random forests - Random forests are a combination of tree predictors such that each
tree depends on the values of a random vector sampled independently and with the same
distribution for all trees in the forest (Breiman, 2001).
Support Vector Machine - An SVM is a kind of large-margin classifier: it is a vector
space based machine learning method where the goal is to find a decision boundary
between two classes that is maximally far from any point in the training data (Manning,
Schütze, & Raghavan, 2008).
Valence Aware Dictionary and Sentiment Reasoner - Valence Aware Dictionary and
Sentiment Reasoner (VADER) is a parsimonious, rule-based model for sentiment
analysis of social media text (Hutto & Gilbert, 2014). Within the context of this research,
VADER’s gold standard list of lexicons provided scoring for words focused on negative
content directly attributed to tweet sentiment.
List of Acronyms
ARFF

Attribute-Relation File Format

AUP

Acceptable Use Policy

CSV

Comma-Separated Values

DMNB

Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes

DSR

Design Science Research

EPA

Electronic Public Access

FPR

False Positive Rate
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HR

Human Resources

IT

Information Technology

LCGDC

Loudoun County General District Court

OCR

Optical Character Recognition

PACER

Public Access to Court Electronic Records

PDF

Portable Document Format

RAT

Routine Activity Theory

SIEM

Security Information and Event Management

SVM

Support Vector Machine

TPB

Theory of Planned Behavior

TPR

True Positive Rate

TRA

Theory of Reasoned Action

WEKA

Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis

VADER

Valence Aware Dictionary for Sentiment Reasoning

Summary
In summary, Chapter 1 discussed the background of insider threats, the industries
significantly impacted, and proposed a way forward based on past research. Specifically,
proposing organizations move from a reactive posture to a proactive stance by examining
sentiment analysis of social media inputs and court case information relating to fraud.
The end goal of this study included determining specific threat levels; this process could
become another tool in an integrated approach to mitigating an insider threat during a
vetting process. The lengthy and tenuous history with insider threats appears to focus on
degrees of monitoring and policy enforcement. For instance, monitoring and placing
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mechanisms that must be observed appears to postpone the inevitable, thus delaying the
threat. Therefore, prudent security involves more than perfecting the effectiveness of
technical controls (Ismail & Yusof, 2018).
Existing works can be extended by integrating sentiment analysis with other
forms of data and adding social attributes to create value in the vetting of individuals
through a more aggressive and proactive measure. This dissertation study had three goals
for conducting this study: (a) to analyze data from new sources to include court cases
centered around fraudulent activities that is applicable within social media Twitter tweets,
(b) to provide another vehicle in vetting individuals that go beyond natural language
processing (NLP) shortcomings with filtering social media posts for dangerous content,
and (c) to deepen analysis through the merging of relevant data attributed with varying
degrees of fraud. The bridging of case notes and transcripts into the social realm provided
a profound advancement with mitigation efforts with insider threats.

20

Chapter 2
Review of Literature

The literature review in this section covers content that directly supports the
research with a close look into monitoring shortcomings, problematic rulemaking, policy
enforcement, and weak vetting practices with onboarding employees. For instance, a
review of self-disclosures is examined as part of the applicants’ hiring and vetting
process. Researchers who conducted ancillary literature reviews considered monitoring
techniques to mitigate an insider threat, but monitoring can become more of a reactive
and labor-intensive means of taking corrective measures. The weaknesses from previous
insider mitigation approaches places emphasis to extend similar works to Park et al.
(2018). This dissertation study’s research is analogous to works from Gritzalis et al.
(2014), who combined social media data to detect both technical threats and threats
associated with theory-based behavioral changes.
This dissertation study selected reviews that addressed existing insider threat
mitigation efforts. Insider threats are defined as a threat typically attributed to legitimate
users who maliciously leverage their system privileges and familiarity and proximity to
their computational environment to compromise valuable information or inflict damages
(Chinchani, Iyer, Ngo, & Upadhyaya, 2005).
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This dissertation study examined literature directly associated with mitigation
strategies that provided a more precise understanding of the problem. From a
foundational point-of-view, Cappelli et al. (2009) suggested that measures that are in
practice today should include best practices in understanding the threat is organizationalwide.
As illustrated within DSR (see Figure 2), the research process incorporated
theories to paint the picture of the insider threat. Leonard, Cronan, and Kreie (2004)
hypothesized that behavioral intention is influenced by an individual’s attitude, which in
turn is influenced by consequences of action and the environment, obligation, and
personal characteristics. Theory-based contributions within the context of this study
augmented other technical and social components of the research.
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Figure 2. Research process. Reprinted from “Outline of a design science research
process,” by P. Offerman, O. Levina, M. Schönherr, and U. Bub, 2009, In Proceedings of
the 4th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and
Technology, 1–11. Adapted with permission.
It is crucial to extend relevant works, capitalize on social media sentiment
analysis (with permission of the author), couple fraudulent case data within the legal
system, and provide a newer mitigation strategy for insider threats. The following
sections focus on what is being done in respect with monitoring, profiling, rulemaking,
policy enforcement, and employee vetting practices, all with their own weaknesses.
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Monitoring and Profiling
Monitoring accounts comprise a significant portion of mitigation strategies and
includes internal network monitoring, external monitoring, and employee monitoring
(Cole, 2015). However, the price tag associated with continuous monitoring is not
apparent. Additionally, it is not practical to institute daily monitoring (Cappelli et al.,
2009) without being mindful of required resources.
Other researchers focused on user profiling with the goal to mitigate insider
threats by profiling user activities such as capturing keystrokes, monitoring web browser
activity, files accessed, removable media, and USB activity. Commands such as Change
Directory (CD), Print Work directory (PWD), List (LS), Copy (CP), and Remove (RM)
are construed as activities that might be labeled as potentially malevolent (Liu, De Vel,
Han, Zhang, & Xiang, 2018). Often, logging user activities with deep analysis has offered
insight into anomalies to address new observations, times of observations, and frequency
of observations. All known cases exhibit a change in user behavior (Legg, 2015).
Similarly, Shaw (2006) conducted observation-based profiling and discovered
through employee profiling, found risk indicators with management labeling workers as
difficult, and often disgruntled with other employees. A higher percent of those being
profiled attracted close observations from those in supervisory positions just before
security incidents. In these instances, identifying the insider threat is flawed when
factoring in time to process; this became a common theme in Shaw’s research. Mitrou,
Kandias, Stavrou, and Gritzalis (2014) stated the following in regard to monitoring social
media:
Online social media profiles, blogs, tweets, and online fora are increasingly
monitored by employers searching for information that may provide insight on
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employees and prospective hires. Taking into consideration the exponentially
growing participation in online social networking sites and social media, it is not
surprising that employers are searching for unique information about applicants
and employees not found with other selection methods. (p. 9)
Monitoring solutions can become costly; however, monitoring solutions creates a
barrier and deterrent for many organizations that need to implement an insider threat
program (Spooner, Silowash, Costa, & Albrethsen, 2018). Organizations may not benefit
by investing significant amounts of time watching for a collection of events through log
analysis or through implementing intrusion detection systems. Kauh et al. (2017)
developed an insider threat model that was capable of inspecting threats within network
packets, with the long-term research goal of detecting insider threats within a network.
From a network perspective, thwarting an insider threat leaves more to be desired
when operating in real-time. Operators must review system attacks without a reference to
anything that is already on file, often becoming ineffective due to changes in the
environment (Benferhat, Boudjelida, Tabia, & Drias, 2013), and can lead to undesirable
results. Similarly, data taken from analyzing security information and event management
(SIEM) content yields problems with parsing data from security logs, making it difficult
to design a detection policy for security threats (Lee & Huh, 2019).
Spooner et al.’s (2018) SIEM study demonstrated capabilities to help mitigate
insider threats through anomaly detection and provide evidence to support legal actions.
However, improperly implemented SIEM benefits result in cumbersome and undesired
tendencies, leading to system issues with log aggregation.
SIEM solutions often come tethered with many problems, such as inconveniences
with log management, reporting, real-time monitoring, integration and deployment,
product quality, and stability (Splunk, 2020). In addition, organizational staff require
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training, product familiarity, effort, and expertise to implement successfully. An
exhaustive suite of tools supports insider threat mitigations; however, some out-of-thebox solutions are somewhat useless and require a significant understanding of the distinct
intellectual property generated across organizational components (Spooner et al., 2018).
False-positive alerts should be addressed for SIEM-related technologies to work;
otherwise, this type of technology could overwhelm analysts, making tasks ineffective
and inefficient. In contrast, precondition or post condition may be missed due to false
negatives (Hubballi, & Suryanarayanan, 2014), which is the absence of alerts in the
presence of attacks (Kenazag, Tayeb, Mahdi, & Aiash, 2016). Moreover, a successful
implementation requires competent security personnel, with focused efforts to correlate
rules to drive down response times and work towards minimizing false-positive alerts
(Vilendečić, Dejanović, & Ćurić, 2017).
Incorrectly implemented technology places the burden on employees. It is
unrealistic to expect an individual to pore over voluminous log files on a daily-basis
(Spooner et al., 2018). The laborious effort to review logs contributes to delays in
identifying threats, which is not a viable solution in preventing an insider threat. While all
aspects to monitoring appear as practical approaches, the process of identifying the threat
is not always real-time; thus, preventive action cannot be taken at the right time (Ambre
& Shekokar, 2015), leaving the insider threat a lingering concern.
The literature demonstrates a wide latitude of methodologies, including surveys,
business cases, machine learning models, sentiment analysis, supervised learning,
unsupervised learning, theory-based, and a host of others. Several methodologies stood
out in unexpected ways. For instance, Bell et al. (2019) used a methodology that involves
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using a survey to provide an in-depth understanding of behavioral indicators. Bell et al.
found the changes in behavior, mindset, and attitude are often displayed either prior to or
during the insider act being committed. In contrast, Williams et al. (2018) conducted
another empirical study and fostered a theory within their survey that correlated with the
range of crime issues connected to the RAT. Williams et al. posited that theories can be
applied to insider cyber victimization.
The issues that result from monitoring practices generate concerns over ethics and
privacy. Acceptable use policies (AUP) are among the most common company policies
that outline how employees can use company systems and what employees can expect in
regard to privacy (Yerby, 2013); however, these policies do not appear to mitigate insider
threat activities. Providing an acceptable use policy is worthless if the employees do not
become aware of them (Alshboul & Streff, 2017). Also, without a successful
implementation, does not change users’ attitudes and behaviors, and makes no impact on
mitigating insider threats (Gallagher, McMenemy, & Poulter, 2015).
Although technology cannot solely guarantee a secure environment for
information, the human aspects of information security should be taken into consideration
(Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). The importance of addressing the insider threat
nontechnical component, moved this research towards leveraging social inputs to drive
the significance through sentiment analysis further.
Rulemaking and Policies
Rulemaking can impact the human and technological aspects of monitoring for
insider threats (Spooner et al., 2018). Linkov, Poinsatte-Jones, Trump, Ganin, and Kepner
(2019) postulated both over-regulation and under-regulation can be exploited by the
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insider threat. An optimal solution to rulemaking and policy enforcement could require
the knowledge to understand the number of rules, instead of measuring the context of
rules. Rules include exceptions due to higher authority principles (Antoniou, Billington,
& Maher, 1999); these exceptions often override older regulations and could present an
unclear direction to employees who rely on voluntary compliance and cooperation
(Pelton, 2017).
Other forms of rulemaking are presented as organizational policies and outlined in
several case studies. Bauer, Bernroider, and Chudzikowski (2017) discovered that many
organizations have policies specifically addressing internal threats; nevertheless,
individuals intentionally act noncompliant. Supplemental measures become ineffective
when responsible personnel violate or override the policies and procedures, irrespective
of whether this is caused by carelessness, poor knowledge, or clear intention to act
dishonestly (Nawawi & Salin, 2018).
Comparatively, Cram, Proudfoot, and D’Arcy (2017) found that organizations
exhibited a lack of continuity with security policies and demonstrated a lack of cohesion
with its employees. The most prevalent relationship within Cram et al.’s framework is the
relationship between enforcement difficulties, excessively complex policies, inadequate
resourcing, and failure to customize policies. Given the voluminous of inefficiencies in
successful policy implementations, the rulemaking variant in a deterrence does not appear
to be a workable solution in preventing the insider threat.
Employment Vetting
The prevention of an attack is just as important as other components to
supplement existing practices; thus, prior researchers have examined various
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methodologies centered around employment vetting. Current vetting mechanisms are
slow and less capable of catching new threats (Chen et al., 2015); yet, companies
continue to rely on these ineffective practices. The vetting of applicants strengthens the
collective efforts in the overall vetting; however, flaws remain due to the over-reliance on
information obtained from the employee (Kühn & Nieman, 2017).
Edward Snowden is a prominent example of flawed employment vetting.
Snowden was a contractor who leaked classified information in 2013 and sailed through
multiple security vetting interventions (Kühn & Nieman, 2017). Simpson and Foltz
(2017) discussed their concern for the lapse of vetting activities between vetting cycles
and a contributing factor. These weaknesses result in unnoticed recognitions in detecting
the trustworthiness of individuals. The vetting process’s flaws include the lack of vetting
the vetting officials, and the tendency for vetting officials to demonstrate a level of bias,
interject, and intertwine personal experiences within the formal hiring process, thus
altering vetting outcomes (Lomas, 2019).
Conversely, employees subjected to polygraphs do not always have questions best
suited to the position for hire; therefore, security vetting investigators can hinder the
detection of misconduct (Kühn & Nieman, 2017). Jeske et al. (2019) found that voluntary
disclosures during preemployment indicate a prospective applicants’ willingness to trust,
privacy concerns, and perceived a vulnerability associated with the use of information
about applicants. These indicators may be important predictors of self-disclosure
involved in information sharing. Even so, the decision to disclose is sometimes forced
upon the employee with little warning, potentially after the hire, and does not appear to
solidify sound practices (Hielscher & Waghorn, 2015).
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Conventional vetting practices that rely on honesty are flawed because employers
are unable to verify the information or determine which information they should not
consider in their decision-making process (Jeske & Holland, 2019). It is possible for
those being interviewed to express some level of undesired personality traits (Roulin &
Bourdage, 2017). Some traits are classified as misleading and considered a potential
threat to businesses, which depicts a dark picture of organizations’ ability to deal with the
threat represented by applicants’ use of deceptive impression management tactics
(Roulin, 2016).
Maasberg, Warren, and Beebe (2015) examined insider threats based on
personality trait profiling during the hiring process. Maasberg et al. aimed to build
propositions of personalities and factored in negative attitudes, malicious intent, triggers,
motives, capabilities, and opportunities centered around security weaknesses. Moreover,
it would appear unmasking the preceding during postemployment, offers even less of a
solution in mitigating an inside threat.
Organizational leaders must focus on the prevention of insider threats in the
earliest stage. BaMaung, McIlhatton, MacDonald, and Beattie (2018) suggested using a
comprehensive and intrusive approach at the earliest onset.
Summary
Previous studies exhibit some level of researched solutions to mitigating insider
threats; however, all strategies appeared to operate with constant monitoring, act in a
reactive state, or rely on employees’ honesty. The crux to this research places the
attention on the human resources (HR) preemployment phase. Preventing potential
threats should be HR’s central issue of concern (Fischbacher-Smith, 2015), and the
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practice of social media vetting can afford the employer access to information about the
candidate that they might not otherwise find (Delarosa, 2015).
From a prevention point of view, some tools and methodologies examined from
prior research leave more to be desired. Past studies have considered plans for continuous
monitoring. Employee monitoring was relatively ineffective for some (Wallace & Loffi,
2014) because this type of monitoring required security expert knowledge of SIEM rule
creations. Other studies indicated that employees who do not understand the correct
balance of security rules within an organization, will not follow the company’s guidance,
and become the precursor to insider threats. Past mitigation strategies have appeared to
fall short of genuinely preventing the insider from entering an organization.
With the advent of social media, there appeared to be a value when analyzing
content for negative sentiments. Gritzalis et al. (2014) postulated that online content
could reveal those who have demonstrating traits of an insider threat. Various researched
approaches from previous studies indicate that sentiment analysis and machine learning
are likenesses to the research from works by Park et al. (2018). However, the main
difference between that study and this is based upon identifying negative sentiments that
directly correlate to fraudulent judicial data extracted from the legal system. Previous
studies’ inclusion of social media data in efforts to mitigate insider threats provided the
foundation for the present study. Such information contributed to the relevancy in
moving away from reactive demeanors to proactive measures.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview
This dissertation study used a design based on DSR to explicitly create IT
artifacts that had unique attributes to promote preemployment security vetting against
insider threats. The artifacts included data extracted from prosecuted fraud cases from the
court system and applied sentiment analysis by combining said data to social inputs,
primarily tweets. Supportive to data collecting came two different sources of data to (a)
build negative lexicons from the court documents, (b) correlate the same negative
lexicons with social media tweets, (c) perform sentiment analysis within the selected
tweets, and (d) discover behavior theories applicable within the fraudulent court data;
discussed in subsequent sections.
The present study’s methodology was similar to research conducted by Zaib, Asif,
and Arooj (2019). Zaib et al. focused on word and sentence tokenizing and provided a
partially based model on implementing tidytext. Zaib et al. used tidytext to collect the
most negative comments and compare word and sentence analysis to tune their approach.
Conversely, Silge and Robinson (2017) found that tidytext included functions and data
sets capable of text conversions that could be integrated with existing text-based mining
packages.
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Hutto and Gilbert (2014) evaluated thousands of unique lexicons and concluded
that VADER was a top contender in regard to speed and capability. It is possible to
leverage existing VADER lexicons through some form of a modified hybrid approach.
For instance, one can update sentiment lexicons through compiling Waikato Environment
for Knowledge Analysis’ (WEKA) word lists in a manual process. The manual updating
of negative lexicons requires updating the polarity scores, editing positive and negative
indicators, the actual lexicons (Bonta & Janardhan, 2010; see Appendix A), and through
the usage of custom created scripts.
Research Methods Employed
The research approach was based on DSR (Offermann et al., 2009). This
dissertation study based the IT artifact’s process design on works by De Leoz and Petter
(2018); this process design is encapsulated within the DSR.
Step 1 in the initial research process involved conducting the literature review on
insider threat mitigation strategies. The conducting of literature review had two goals:
This dissertation study’s goal was to review what has already been done and determine
the approaches that have and have not worked. Then, focusing on promising works that
had aspects that were pertinent to the research goal and sought to evaluate (a) social
inputs as sources of data and (b) court transcripts of cases that dealt with many instances
of fraud.
The literature on behavioral theories was applied within specific cases involving
fraudulent activity, providing insight into other characteristics that are related to threats.
Empirical studies are more trustworthy when the researcher focuses on specific domains
of insider threats (Schryen et al., 2016); the behavioral context was crucial to the
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collected material within the present study. The research process evolved within the 11
defined steps of DSR, and introduced additional literature to support the research.
This dissertation study accurately identified the research problem in Step 2 of the
research process. The research problem was based on what is known from the collected
literature. The corresponding need to review additional literature can be revisited during
Step 6 in the DSR process if the problem identification changes.
Also reviewed, were other input sources such as case summaries, deadlines,
hearings, docket reports, filers, history documents, parties, related transactions, case
review of court transcripts, plea agreements, case notes, and available court reporting in
Step 3 of the DSR. A sufficient number of cases supported each of the created artifacts.
The evaluation of relevancy was ensured and in alignment with the fraudulent events
within Step 4 of the DSR. Data that were unrelated to the various forms of fraud were
dismissed and not included in the study. The design of the IT artifact in Step 5 was a
crucial research component; however, the design did require additional literature
research, as identified in Step 6.
Step 7 proved to be an imperative step with DSR and withing the context of this
research, allowed modifications of the research questions. For instance, one of the initial
research questions left an open-ended direction for the study and was later dropped. The
original DSR utilized a hypothesis refinement for this step; however, this research opted
to replace the hypothesis refinement with refinement of the research questions.
During Step 8, various tools provided the processing of data, such as Garner’s
(1995) WEKA, Jünger and Keyling’s (2013) FacePager, custom-written scripts, and the
other tools listed in the resource requirement’s section of this study. WEKA was used to
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analyze content from Twitter, with keyword analysis from extracted data within the court
transcripts relating to fraud.
The goal was to conduct as many experiments as needed to conclude with logical
predictions when ranking the negative lexicons found within fraudulent court data, and
then use sentiment analysis as an approach to score specific threats (Biswas,
Mukhopadhyay, & Gupta, 2018). For instance, the totality of negative sentiments (see
Figure 3) is evaluated by an organization’s limit with scoring insider treat predictions;
each organization sets their own acceptable scores.
This dissertation study examined behavioral theories and paired specific theories
as applicable through observation and interpretation of court documents during Step 9.
Many behavioral theories came into focus; however, six were notable and one theory
appeared most prevalent across all lab experiments.
Implementation of created artifacts requires organizations to access prospective
new hires’ publicly available social media content. There did not appear to be ethical
issues in accessing openly available data. Although, Lupton and Michael’s (2017) study
presented ethical issues, as participants were often highly aware that companies such as
Facebook and Google track their preferences, habits, and the content they upload to
social media.
The output from all tools was delivered in the form of a report that explained the
findings within the insider threat predictions (see Figure 3). These findings indicated the
level of threat based on data specifically centered around fraud. The scores represent the
totality of all negative sentiment scores. An example of the predictions was drawn from
each respective lab experiment results (-4.77, -10.45, -11.69, -16.06, -13.09, and -12.20).
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All lab results demonstrated low to excessive content associated with fraud. A logical
conclusion would include not hiring individuals with scores that exceed an organization’s
specific threshold.

Figure 3. Insider threat predictions.

In Step 10, this dissertation study provided a method for further research that may
influence the final step, and presented a summary of the findings in Step 11. All
advancements within the study significantly supports design science knowledge base and
becomes a part of the knowledge contribution. Organizational leaders who have a richer
understanding of insider threats can help mitigate insider threats using a preemptive
approach. Preemptive approaches can improve preemployment vetting.
Instrument Development and Validation
This dissertation study highlighted synopses with instrument development and
validation with granularity; listed subsequent sections. The study outcome provided
output to support sentiment analysis research associated with fraud and the ranking of
social media data. The instrument development and validation supports the development
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of a tool to improve employee vetting and will help organizations work towards another
mitigation strategy against the insider threat.

37
Collection of Court Documents
The aim of this research was to develop an instrument that consists of creating IT
artifacts from multiple sources of data. The core instruments come from the analysis of
case data of fraud through a software suite of tools listed in the resource requirement’s
section of this study.
This dissertation study examined prosecuted fraud cases to extract negative
sentiment with the belief that uniqueness of undesirable traits from criminal activities are
advantageous to the study. Understanding the courts’ search parameters from the legal
component led to starting the process to gain access to preceding types of documents,
following two established processes for collecting court documents: (a) created an
account and completed the application for multi-court exemption from the Judicial
Conference’s Electronic Public Access (EPA) and (b) submitted the form through regular
mail delivery or electronically. No charges incur while conducting research once the fee
waiver is granted; however, nominal transaction charges are incurred if fees are not
waived. According to PACER (2020), nominal transaction charges are based on the
following:
The PACER cost is $0.10 per page with a cap of $3 per document, except
transcripts. What is the cost for using CM/ECF? There is no additional fee
associated with the CM/ECF system. Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER) is an electronic public access service that costs $0.10 per page.
(PACER.gov, 2020, p. 1)
A valid login and password are required after successful account creation. In
addition, the client code of “SME” is required, and then used the required credentials to
log in to USCourts.gov’s PACER system. There was a requirement to register for
accessing data through the ECF/SMG portal. Although the overall process is effortless,
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the time required to complete the process necessitated a brief delay and lasted several
days.
A selection to the electronic case files and PACER case locator is required, and
allows logging in. It is critical to choose the appropriate court system; the chosen court
system should be consistent with the EPA request. This dissertation study used the
California Northern District Court and The Superior Court of California County of Santa
Clara to gain public access to electronic court records. Preliminary data for initial queries
consisted of the following: (a) case numbers, (b) case status (all), (c) file date and last
entry date (empty), (d) nature of suit, and (e) cause of action (18:1030 computer fraud
and abuse). The executed query ran after entering the above selections. PACER returned
a sample listing of cases, and each case could be selected using the case number (see
Table 2).
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Table 2
PACER Sample Inquiry
Case number

Filed under

Dates files

Nature of suit

1001

Acme v. Individual A

Filed 01/31/2000 closed
6/13/2000

18:1030(18:1030
Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act)

1002

Smarts v. Individual B

Filed 06/16/2000 closed
12/07/2000

18:1030(18:1030
Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act)

1003

Taxi Co. v. Individual C

Filed 09/06/2000 closed
12/07/2000

18:1030(18:1030
Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act)

1004

Jobs Inc. v. Individual D Filed 03/19/2001 closed
10/25/2002

18:1030(18:1030
Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act)

1005

Toys Co. v. Individual E Filed 05/16/2002 closed
05/05/2004

18:1030(18:1030
Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act)

1006

Cars Co. v. Individual F

Filed 09/13/2002 closed
12/19/2002

18:1030(18:1030
Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act)

1007

Homes Inc. v. Individual Filed 03/04/2003 closed
G
09/17/2003

18:1030(18:1030
Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act)

All counsel and parties accessing documents filed with the court are responsible
for redacting personal identifiers from all downloaded documents (USCourts.Gov, 2019).
The redaction of personal identification is pursuant to a Local Civil Rule 7(c)(2) and
Local Criminal Rule 47(c)(2). All extracted data will have data redaction in-place and
exhibit a level of anonymity to demonstrate compliance.
Each query is saved into a PDF or comma-separated values (CSV) document
using a naming convention. The file’s prefix uses the initial data source as its designation.
For instance, PACER uses “PACER” for all electronic court records, and state and local
governments used either Santa Clara, Illinois, Albemarle, Fairfax, Loudoun, or Prince
William county to represent the general district courts. The second designation is the case
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number followed by a numerical designation to reflect an IT artifact’s association. The
Bear File converter is used to convert from TEXT or CSV if files are not in the required
format. The goal is to provide a repeatable document conversion process. In many
instances, PDF files are opened with iSkySoft and saved into text format. Later, the files
are loaded into Excel, where the content is sorted and duplicate words are removed. In
the present study, multiple test cases were saved and the following file name formatting
was used: “State-CaseID.TXT” (e.g., CA-C123456.txt). In the example given, the
filename represents case data from California, and the identification assigned by the court
is C123456. In addition, each filename was unique to each lab experiment.
Read Court Documents into WEKA
The first validation process required making the primary data accessible within
WEKA and validated court case data using WEKA’s explorer option to import the CSV
(or .XLS) file. Then, saving the file as an attribute-relation file format (ARFF) American
National Standards Institute compatible file was required. This dissertation study then
created sentiment analysis by using a classification process based on sentiment weights.
The initial classification used various algorithms within the lab experiments and a
filtering mechanism to support supervised learning.
The initial results yielded a successful validation (see Figure 4); however, the
process became a component in the pairing with other data used in the research. The
actual weights were obtained by importing VADER’s negative sentiment lexicons.
VADER’s lexicons perform exceptionally well in the social media domain (Hutto &
Gilbert, 2014) and were advantageous to the present study. However, the way VADER
(see Appendix B) data imports into WEKA, a custom script is used to rewrite each
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sentiment’s weight; thus, these scripts use the actual weight of each lexicon rather than
WEKA’s default values of 1.0. The only exception to this logic is to assign WEKA’s
default weighted values for words that do not exist in the base lexicon word list. The
value of 0 is assigned in these instances.

Figure 4. WEKA preprocessing readable sample data.

Produce Social Media Exports in FacePager
The second validation process required each social media export to pass through
preprocessing in Microsoft Excel to (a) eliminate duplicate words using an internal sort
function and (b) eliminate content deemed not relevant in building a lexicon before
saving. As part of the preprocessing to ensure all data is readable and capable of being
interpreted in WEKA, all validations must be met. Similarly, with court cases, an import
to WEKA is performed through the program’s explorer option. WEKA is expected to
read the data and produce content (see Figure 4) that could be used in further analysis.
The other input source came from collecting publicly accessible Twitter tweets
within FacePager. To accessed this input source required opening the FacePager
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application and select the “New Database” option. In the “Save As” field, entering the
database name will represent the source of Internet data (i.e., Twitter-1000), left the
“Tags” field empty, and changed “Where” to a folder location (i.e., DISS901-3\Twitter).
On the lower portion of the screen, “Twitter” was selected. Under the same general
section, required selection of a “Resource” and required that the field was set to
“/statuses/user_timeline;” this can also be set by clicking on the API image at the top
portion of the screen. Within the API interface, a requirement of the same Twitter API is
was applied. Other required settings included (a) adding a setup query string consisting of
“https://api.twitter.com/1.1” into the base path, (b) setting the resource to
“/statuses/user_timeline,” setting the parameters to “user_id and references <Object
ID>,” and setting the maximum pages to 1000. Under settings, ensured “Select All
Nodes” was selected, that “Maximum Errors” was set to 99, and that “Log All Requests”
was checked. Using the custom table columns window, adding a new key called “text”
and applied to the “Apply Column Setup” saved the setting. The “text” showed within the
upper objects and query window.
Next, each value (see Figure 5) was deleted in the access token and access token
secret and required secure consumer keys (see Figure 6) from the Twitter developer’s
account and access was granted after Twitter vetted the application. The access settings
were applied to the consumer keys (see Figure 7) within the “Authentication Settings”
window. To set the access token and access token secret, required logging into Twitter
and selecting “Add Node” on the upper part of the screen. This dissertation study used
Calculator.net’s (2020) random number generator to create a comprehensive list of
numbers from a lower limit of 1067092933653692416 and an upper limit of
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1267092933653692415 and generated 20,000 unique numbers, and then sorted the
numbers in ascending order. The long integers corresponded to possible Twitter IDs.
Using Notepad, output was saved to a folder used in later reference (i.e.,
C:\Research\Twitter).

Figure 5. FacePager access token.

Figure 6. Consumer keys.
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Figure 7. Authentication settings.

Next, content was copied and pasted from the Notepad into the “Add Node” box.
Under “Settings,” select both “All Nodes” and the “Fetch Data” options are selected.
Next, highlight any object type labeled “Data” within the upper leftmost box and verify
that the rightmost box had Tweets in the Key (text) field’s value. Once multiple data
fields showed meaningful data, all Tweets are exported by selecting all results and using
use the “Export Data” option. Content was saved within the root folder under
C:\ Research Twitter Tweets\TwitterData.csv.
Later, the dissertation study used Vicinitas’ (2020) services to query Twitter
feeds for March 2019; this query included 20,000 random tweets. Data were provided in
an Excel worksheet, and only the text of the Tweets was saved to a similar file, such as
C:\Research \Tweets \Vicinitas\Tweets\TwitterData.csv. Additionally, the data was saved
as an Excel file from the .xlsx format to the .xls for compatibility with WEKA’s Excel
converter 1.0.7. This dissertation study used data from Vicinitas because of the quickest
data availability. Both FacePager or Vicinitas processes works, but the latter is
considered the most productive; providing faster overall processing.
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Import Social Media into WEKA
The preceding section detailed how to move data into WEKA as part of the
validation process; the same methodology must be applied to the FacePager data. The
validation of FacePager data remains consistently the same, aside from differences in
data attributes. A decision was made to save imported social media data to an ARFF
compatible file (see Appendix C). Similar to court case data, there was a need to create
sentiment analysis using the same word classifications. This dissertation study initially
used Naïve Bayes for word classification. Naïve Bayes is a probabilistic method that has
high accuracy and performance in text classification (Sari, Kurniawati, Prayitno, &
Irfangi, 2019) with a probabilistic classifier for the normal distribution to model numeric
attributes (Amin & Habib, 2015). However, manually traversing the classifications within
WEKA led to an extensive delay while testing various classifications. Ultimately, using
Auto-WEKA provided an easier initial approach, especially when dealing with large
datasets, repetitive classification testing and knowing how to choose among the dozens of
machine learning procedures implemented in WEKA and each procedure’s
hyperparameter settings to achieve good performance (Kotthoff, Thornton, Hoos, Hutter,
& Leyton-Brown, 2017). Because of Auto-WEKA’s ability to select the best
classification, efforts later ran manual classifications comparisons against Auto-WEKA,
and used Trees Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and DMNB. The results yielded successful
validations, which became a component in the pairing with other data used in the
research.

46
Perform Sentiment Analysis
Sentiment analysis was needed to best understand the existence of fraud within
the context of social media and performed in WEKA through importing and pairing each
court case involving fraud with one social media input as ARFF compatible file, and then
applied WEKA’s Auto-WEKA document classification (see Appendix D) to select the
best algorithm; the best algorithm is typically Trees Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, or
DMNB. This dissertation study leveraged further filtering and analysis by using the
WEKA package AffectiveTweets. The importance of using AffectiveTweets is centered
around the package’s ability to analyze tweets. According to Branz and Brockmann
(2018), AffectiveTweets provides many capabilities and notable filtering to demonstrate
negative sentiment with emphasis to anger, disgust, fear; all of which is based on
sentiment lexicon scoring. In additions, AffectiveTweets can analyze social media
sentiment and is key in the distant supervision method for models using unlabeled tweets
(Bravo-Marquez, Frank, Pfahringer, & Mohammad, 2019), which was a critical element
within this study.
Technological Aspects
The technological aspects of this study were purely driven by the tools used
within the study and the ease of data collections in leveraging Internet data. Specifically,
the use of the Internet played an instrumental role in the research. The Internet created the
method to reach into the court systems, and more importantly, social inputs. Both
endpoints provided a deeper understanding of common sentiments extracted from
fraudulent cases and helped to potentially identify insider threats.
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Behavioral Theory-Based Aspects
The social component of behavioral theories played an essential role in
understanding the sentiment analysis’ outcome. An abundant number of behavioral
theories represent individuals’ mindsets and explains individuals’ pathway to becoming a
threat. Social and internal mechanisms play a critical role in a person’s mind, as these
mechanisms silence one’s urge to follow moral obligation when people act illegally (Shi,
Booth, & Simon, 2017). Various behavioral theories were examined and became an
integral component of the study.
Sample Data
This dissertation study obtained sample data from two key sources: (a) court
documentation from The Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara, The
Northern District of California San Francisco Division, The United States District Court
Northern District of Illinois, and The United States District Court Southern District of
California and (b) publicly available Twitter tweets.
The research followed the data analysis as referenced in the GPFLE section for
consistency and ensured all processed data could be read through various programs.
Initially, all court data was scrubbed for blank records, duplicates, and other evidence of
insufficient data. In some other cases, data was not able to be read until installing OCR
plug-ins. A series of custom scripts and programs corrected formatting issues and saved
into a format compatible with WEKA. The collection of Twitter tweets included
information requiring redaction. In these instances, user id, user screen name, bio,
location, following, followers, and favorites were all excluded while exporting data into
WEKA.
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Through additional scripts came the resulting ARFF compatible files used by
WEKA in the analysis and tweet classifications. Outside of WEKA's purview left the
behavioral theory interpretations, which augmented the study's classification and
analysis. The subsequent data analysis, the GPFLE process, and lab experiments provide
a closer look into the lab experiments' data interactions.
Data Analysis
Sentiment analysis may be one of the best tools for making predictions within
social media content. Within the context of this study, sentimental analysis was
applicable and built on lexicon data from fraudulent cases. Building dictionaries for each
word’s contextual characteristics—such as its order in the text, part of speech,
cooccurrence with other words, and other contextual characteristics specific to the text in
which the word appears—is essential (Shapiro, Sudhof, & Wilson, 2018).
A host of tools to predict insider threats were readily available. For instance, this
dissertation study used each respective set of files within WEKA to perform sentiment
analysis using each dictionary and each crawl of social media with FacePager. The
dissertation study’s goal was to rank sentiments associated with fraud, yet conform to a
lexicon-based negative social media sentiment, as Hutto and Gilbert (2014) demonstrated
in their multiple-domain model. The lexicon construction’s foundation included using
cases of fraud, social media inputs, and news articles, which presented a wide latitude of
sentiments and were used throughout all lab experiments.
Sufficient literature on insider mitigation strategies exists; however, other avenues
must be traversed, which provided a starting point for this study. An attempt was made to
(a) use the baseline of negative sentiment lexicons, (b) examine criminal cases of fraud,
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(c) determine similarities, (d) traverse Twitter tweets in an attempt to find Tweets that
shared commonalities, (e) perform sentiment analysis, and (f) correlate common themes
of behavioral theories to the outcome.
The dissertation study’s data analysis provided insight into the correlation of
lexicon data, increased understandings of social inputs through machine learning,
promoted IT artifact creations and usage, and used Hutto and Gilbert’s (2014) lexicons to
analyze custom scripts and WEKA’s AffectiveTweets package to examine all sources of
court data to produce a summary of results.
Formats for Presenting Results
The dissertation study intended to examine social inputs coming from fraudulentrelated activities and use sentiment analysis as one of its core tools. The results provided
a better understanding of insider threat mitigation, as examined within employee vetting.
Supplemental results revealed annotations from insider threat rankings and socialbehavioral theories to support the findings.
This study’s results came through outputs of classifications, IT artifact
correlations of sentiment from social inputs, and insider threat lexicons from fraud. The
output from DSR provided contributions to solution and problem-domain maturities by
supportive means to adaptations and provide a pathway of improvements within the
scope of insider threat mitigations. The presented results include charts, figures, tables,
and other visual means to describe the findings, with supplemental information in the
appendices and references.
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Resource Requirements
Due to the nature of the research with leveraging content from social media,
institutional review board approval was not required because the investigation did not
directly interface with people. The information collected was publicly available from
social media websites, and the content is retrieved through no special means aside from
using tools designed to collect data. This dissertation study was granted a Twitter
developer’s account and passed Twitter’s vetting process. In addition to social media
data, requests for court-filed insider threat case information directly related to fraud
within Albemarle, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William County general district courts
was initiated. This dissertation study’s preliminary requests for information indicated that
it is possible to obtain this information using only a case number and, in some instances,
a nominal fee for court transcripts. Online information is available to the public without
any special access; however, court documents fall under the Freedom of Information Act.
This dissertation study used the following hardware and software within this
study. Aside from Internet connections, all hardware and software are considered
operating within one physical location. Both Microsoft Windows 10 (1909) and Apple
macOS High Sierra 10.13.6 operating systems provided the base for which all research
tools operated and detailed in the following section.
Research Tools
WEKA
WEKA is used as an input and output tool that reads inputs from social media
imported Excel data, provides output with both sentiment analysis, and uses classification
output and sentiment filtering. In addition, WEKA uses a common file format to store its
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data sets, thus presenting the user with a consistent view of the data regardless of what
machine learning scheme may be used (Garner, 1995).
FacePager
FacePager is used for fetching publicly available data from YouTube, Twitter,
and other websites based on APIs and web scraping. All data are stored in an SQLite
database and may be exported to CSV (GitHub.com, 2020). FacePager was used to test
fetching Twitter data during the pre-research phase. This process provided insight into
methods used later within the study.
Auto-WEKA
Auto-WEKA makes it easy for non-experts to find the best classification
algorithm within WEKA along with a good hyper-parameter configuration for a given
application scenario, with little human time and within a reasonable amount of fully
automated computation (Thornton, Hutter, Hoos, & Leyton-Brown, 2012). The
classification algorithm selection process necessitated very little input. However, this
study leveraged the WEKA generic object editor to set optional parameters within the
Auto-WEKA classification selection process.
Auto-WEKA’s classification parameters are as follows: batch size (100) debug
(false), check capabilities (false), memory limit (8192), metric to optimize (error rate),
best configs (1), decimal places (2), parallel runs (1), seed (123), and time limit (60). The
only settings changed for the lab experiments are memory and time limit. Each respective
default values of the two settings were 1024 and 15 (see Appendix D, Figure D5).
The Auto-WEKA package uses an input tool to analyze data, determines the
optimal classification algorithm, and apply the algorithm to data. The process to achieve
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the optimal algorithm is driven by the data being ingested. According to Kotthoff,
Thornton, Hoos, Hutter, and Leyton-Brown (2017), not every classifier will apply to
every dataset. The primary reason is due to the classification process’s ineffectiveness in
handling missing data and applies a subset of classifiers within the optimal solution.
Examples of the different classifiers are outlined within the lab experiments, with AutoWEKA selecting either Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, or DMNB. However, Random
Tree, Lazy IBk, and SVM were also evaluated.
AffectiveTweets
AffectiveTweets is implemented as a package for WEKA machine-learning
workbench and provides methods for calculating state-of-art affect analysis features from
tweets (Bravo-Marquez et al., 2019). This dissertation study used AffectiveTweets to
analyze social media content and produce output in determining sentiment scores;
detailed within the lab experiments.
WEKAExcel
WEKAExcel is used to import Excel files into WEKA. Once successful imports
occur, WEKA can save data in a standard file format that becomes usable to any
machine-learning scheme.
Java
Java 8u261 is a requirement for the WEKA version used in the research.
Visual Studio
Visual Studio 2019 v16.8.4 was used to create custom code (see Appendix E, F,
G, H, and I).
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Office 365
Office 365 was used to produce research reports.
Google Scholar
Google Scholar was used to collect research content separate from Nova
Southeastern University’s library.
PACER
The PACER system has brought the citizens ever closer to the courthouse. Public
access to court documents is faster, better, and cheaper than at any prior time in U.S.
history (Martin, 2008). PACER is a useful input tool in requesting court data.
iSkySoft Editor
iSkySoft editor was used to read input PDF court data and to create exportable
files used by custom scripts within the study.
NSU Library
The Nova Southeastern Library was instrumental in the collection of literature. In
many instances, literature did not exist without paying for subscriptions to many of the
top journals.
FiOS Internet
FiOS Internet provided communications to allow the research to take place.
Summary
The methodology overview detailed the 11 steps of DSR, including creating the
IT artifacts and ranking the sentiment analysis of multisource data by analyzing each
collected data set. Each data set represented a single IT artifact. In addition to the social
and fraud inputs, behavioral theories contributed towards a holistic representation of each
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IT artifact. This chapter outlined a listing of required resources that were needed to
support data collections, analysis, and suggested sampling. The instrument development
and validation process provided a glimpse into pairing data, performing sentiment
analysis, ranking potential insider threats, and why specific traits for fraud takes place.
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Chapter 4
Results

Data Analysis
All lab experiments correlated to the creation of each IT artifact and provided a
way to rank fraudulent case data in the sentiment of Twitter content. The data analysis
revealed the attributes associated with insider threats and identified various machinelearning algorithms that can be used to leverage inputs from court documents on fraud.
The data provided ample content to construct the subsequent IT artifacts and pairing of
each artifact with the negative VADER sentiments. Similarly, the study’s uniqueness
included specific VADER’s negative sentiments that were extracted from court
proceedings (see Appendix J) and deemed relatable to criminal activities.
Initially, this dissertation study planned to use Naïve Bayes as the primary
classifier; however, the discovery of Auto-WEKA and manual WEKA, appeared to be
more beneficial than any specific algorithm. For instance, Auto-WEKA supports an
intelligent algorithm selection that is beyond other manual selecting of classifications
within WEKA. Auto-WEKA supports the selection of 30 classifications by automatically
reviewing performance generalizations and applies model optimizations previously
believed to be only a manual process (Kotthoff, Thornton, & Hutter, 2017).
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The output from each experiment is carefully examined in the subsequent
sections, with emphasis placed upon each unique court case. Additionally, the processes
included discoveries with negative sentiments found within social inputs, specifically
within Tweets. Each IT artifact is traceable to a specific case of fraud, and relations to
negative sentiments are uncovered within tweets. The analysis coincides with many of
the referenced behavioral theories to illustrate the social aspect of the IT artifact.
General Procedures for Lab Experiments (GPFLE)
All lab experiments required three data sources: (a) court documentation retrieved
through USCourts.gov’s website, (b) negative social media sentiment, and (c) Twitter
tweets. The uniqueness of each artifact was established through individually collected
court data. All other data collections were replicated through each experiment to include
over 7,000 of Hutto and Gilbert’s (2014) negative sentiment lexicons and 20,000 Twitter
tweets from 2019. For ease of repetition, the experiments referenced GPFLE as a starting
point.
The sequential effort began with collecting data from the courts. This process
required the study to convert the source PDF files into text by using the iSkySoft
document converter. Next, saving the output file (e.g., CA-C1903821.txt) into a text file
with each line within the file representing each word in the referenced case number. A
few instances did require using the optical character recognition (OCR) plug-in. In
addition, this dissertation study created a custom program called PDF-TextToProcessedText (see Appendix I) to read each line of the converted text file and write a
new file that included corrections for formatting. Other processing included importing the
text file to Microsoft Excel, sorted and removed duplicate words by ensuring the
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data/sorting advanced unique records was the only option selected, saved the Excel file
back into the text file, and saved the text file into the .xls format to support compatibility
with WEKA’s Excel converter 1.0.7. Additional preparations required launching WEKA
from a command prompt within the c:\program files\WEKA\subdirectory, and then
invoking the “Java -Xmx8192m -jar WEKA.jar” command. Failure to change the
application’s access to additional heap memory led to heap errors, errors when
marshaling XML response, and unanticipated program termination. A later discovery
narrowed down the preceding problem with Auto-WEKA and using the graphical user
interface on the Apple OSX. Because of the issue, launching WEKA from the command
line as annotated above, was the only course of action in allowing the automatic
classification process to continue.
The collection of Twitter data was received as an Excel file and then saved to a
CSV file. The last of the initial parallel effort concluded with converting Hutto and
Gilbert’s (2014) social media VADER sentiment lexicons into a readable format for later
processing. The dissertation study accomplished the preceding by using a custom
program to pair negative sentiments within the court data.
The dissertation study developed a sequence of short programs to stage and test
the data. The assignment of weights to court lexicons (see Appendix E) program reads
the text files, creates a new output file with the content from the input, and paired with
associate sentiment weight from Hutto and Gilbert’s (2014) sentiment weights. The
output is read into WEKA, along with Twitter data, and sentiment analysis is performed.
Converting Twitter tweets into fixed words (see Appendix F) was accomplished by
reading the 20,000 tweets from the master CSV file and convert into plain text. Two
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sequencers (see Appendix G and H) first read each line from court documents and looks
up occurrences within the matching file. If a match is found, the output is written as a hit;
with matching lexicon and weight (i.e., trouble, -1.5). If a match is not found, the output
is written to the same file with a neutral zero weight. The second sequencer reads each
line from the hits file and locates possible hits in the Twitter file. If matching tweets exist,
record the lexicon and number of times found (i.e., trouble, -1.5). If a match is not found,
the output is written to the same file using a zero weight as 0.0. Because iSkysoft created
an unformatted layout, the last program converted iSkysoft’s output into formatted text
(see Appendix I).
Using the previously created “hits” file as an input, examining the Tweets for
words that existed in the “hits” file and recorded the word and total occurrences within
the Tweets was needed. Next, the final output file was saved as “Found-In-SocialMedia.” The file was later used by Excel and prepared by the following steps:
•

Opened the “Found-In-Social-Media” file using Excel.

•

Used the Excel Import Wizard to select “Delimited with Tabs”

•

Reviewed the data in the lower portion of the window, then clicked
“Next” followed by “Finished”

•

Saved with “Save-as CSV” (MS-DOS; *.csv)

After the programs produced the initial data captures, this dissertation study used
WEKA to load the “Found-In-Social-Media.csv” file by opening and then saving the
CSV fie to an ARFF file. Works by Bravo-Marquez et al. (2019) led to the use of
AffectiveTweets text classification 1.0.2 filter for analyzing the sentiments of Tweets.
The package supporting the WEKA/filters/supervised/attribute and made was installed to
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support Tweet selections, and used the preprocess tab under attributes to create the
statistics for 28 attributes.
Lastly, the ending component in the artifact creation required examining relevant
behavioral theories that applied to the court-collected data. The dissertation study’s
understanding of the context of the events leading up to the fraud warranted an
examination of the behavioral aspects that contributed to the study’s conclusion.
Lab Experiment 1: Artifact 1
The artifact ID identified by the first lab experiment was SC-1903821. In this
instance, Santa Clara, California provided data from a fraud case that was estimated at
$500,000 in losses to a local business. The following steps were executed to create the
artifact, apply both court and reporting notes, and connect to a specific behavioral theory.
This dissertation study followed the GPFLE process for Lab Experiment 1 and
supplemented the process with the following activities: determine artifact scores, tweet
negative emotion scores, optimal classification, and artifact negative summary.
WEKA became an instrumental tool of the study, and within the process tab,
provided various scores (see Table 3) for 27 attributes. The attributes included values
derived from “TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,”
“TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and “TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector”
filters. The Artifact 1 detailed scores can be found in Table 3. The most prominent Tweet
negative emotion (see Appendix K) scores (see Figure 8) are the four listed within the
negative summary and the same presented in an alternate view (see Figure 9).
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Table 3
Artifact 1 Detailed Scores
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

-2.5

2.4

.986

.911

Hits

0

90

27.886

26.452

NRC-AffectIntensity-AngerScore

0

.485

.008

.063

NRC-Hash-SentposScore

0

.573

.069

.187

NRC-Hash-SentnegScore

-1.244

0

-.268

.183

NRC-10-Anger

0

1

.017

.13

NRC-10-Trust

0

1

.143

.351

NRC-10-Negative

0

1

.023

.15

NRC-10-Positive

0

1

.253

.441

NRC-10-ExpandedAnger

0

.037

.004

.011

NRC-10-ExpandedAnticipation

0

.079

.009

.023

NRC-10-ExpandedDisgust

0

.01

.001

.003

NRC-10-ExpandedFear

0

.01

.001

.003

NRC-10-ExpandedJoy

0

.094

.009

.028

NRC-10-Sadness

0

.016

.002

.005

NRC-10-Surprise

0

.037

.004

.011

NRC-10-Trust

0

.02

.002

.006

Sentiment weight
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Table 3
Artifact 1 Detailed Scores (continued)
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

NRC-10-ExpandedNegative

0

.106

.01

.031

NRC-10-Expanded
Positive

0

.121

.012

.036

SentiWordnetposScore

0

.354

.082

.124

SentiWordnetnegScore

-.344

0

-.115

.109

Mpqa-posCount

0

1

.36

.481

Mpqa-negCount

0

1

.17

.13

BingLiu-negCount

0

1

.17

.13

AFINN-posScore

0

2

.623

.875

AFINN-negScore

-3

0

-.051

.344

S140-posScore

0

.27

.172

.06

S140-negscore

-.18

0

-.003

.023

Figure 8. Artifact 1 Tweet negative emotion scores.
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Figure 9. Artifact 1 negative summary.

The Naïve Bayes classification was initially thought to be the preferred classifier
within all lab experiments; however, after manually testing various classifiers, the Trees
Random Forest classification algorithm was selected and then applied against court data
(see Figure 10). Although the algorithm provided comparable accuracy over some of the
other classifiers within this lab experiment, not all experiments produced similar results;
in this instance, Trees Random Forest (see Appendix L) yielded a conducive Kappa score
(see Appendix M) of 0.8055.

Figure 10. Artifact 1 Trees Random Forest classification.
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The following section evaluates the outcome from the classification process and
delves deeper into the True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR), and the
Precision. First, according to Azar, Elshazly, Hassanien, and Elkorany (2014), the True
Positive Rate (TPR) is representative of positive classes correctly classified by a model is
achieved. Second, the False Positive Rate (FPR) represents the fraction of negative
classes that are identified as positive. And third, the Precision is the exactness of a
classifier (Kaur & Saini, 2015), and ideally having a higher precision closer to 1.0
correlates to fewer false positives.
Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.873
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s
weighted average scored a 0.039; acceptable and low. The non-weighted average for the
Precision was manually calculated at an average of 0.539 and appears comparable to
other experiments, though lower than expected.
Although this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without values, this
was likely due to a sparse data capture. Instances of zero-valued classes accounted for
two negative lexicons; complaint and felony. Class values greater than zero and less than
one accounted for two lexicons; active and parties are not listed with negativity. And the
last class with values equal to one accounted for three lexicons bold, justice, and number;
not appearing in negative lexicon listings (see Appendix Q). Furthermore, this
experiment’s classification of zero-valued TPR classes could be identifiers with lexicons
associated with fraud.
The recall is defined as the number of relevant items retrieved as a proportion of
all the relevant items that might potentially be retrieved (Walters, 2016) and in the
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instance from this experiment, two classifications with two lexicons yielded no recall.
While the F-Measure effectively references the TP to the arithmetic mean of predicted
positives and real positives, being a constructed rate normalized in an idealized value
(Powers, 2020), several instances was undefined and is believed to be due zero TP values
within the limited data capture.
Other classification details include the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC).
The MCC is a more reliable statistical rate which produces a high score only if the
prediction obtained good results (Chicco & Jurman, 2020). As with the Precision, Recall,
and F-Measure, the best explanation for MCC’s unknown values is likely due to the
comparatively small size of both positive and negative records within the data. When '?'
symbols appear in the output, the specific class may have not enough samples or none of
the samples can be assigned to the class (Stackoverflow, 2021). With the increase in data
within subsequent experiments, it is postulated the numbers will not remain undefined.
Lastly, the examination of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC), a plot of the true
positive rate against the false-positive rate at various threshold settings (Egieyeh, Syce,
Malan, & Christoffels, 2018) had a weighted average of 0.962. According to Fan,
Upadhye, and Worster (2006), general interpretation of the value is high discriminatory,
yet anything higher and closer to 1.0 is very rare. Interestingly, the following
experiments’ volume of data significantly increases, and class accuracies are further
examined with the expectancy to help postulate cohesions shared within all experiments.
Lastly, the ending component in the artifact creation required the examination of
relevant behavioral theories as applied to the court collected data. According to
D’Addona (2019):
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Over the course of his 30 years in the coaching profession, the defendant had the
opportunity to train, develop, and establish swimmers and programs throughout
the United States. He came to SCSC in September of 1995 as the Associate Head
Coach, under Dick Jochums. Working with Jochums, SCSC went on to win two
National titles for men and one national title combined. Following the retirement
of Jochums in December of 2006, the defendant was elevated to the position of
Head Coach of Santa Clara Swim Club. In that position, the club saw tremendous
growth in terms of both performance and number of swimmers and programs
offered to the swimming community. In September of 2009, the defendant was
also given the title of CEO of the organization. (p. 1)
The turn of unfortunate events shared by D’Addona aligns with the RAT. In this
instance, the offender leveraged his tenure and promotions through the ranks to place
himself in a position with access to financial components within the organization.
According to Cohen & Felson’s (1979), definition of RAT, the circumstances
surrounding the embezzlement was demonstrated through the lack of capable guardians
against criminal activities, and the offender sought suitable targets; all in alignment with
the theory.
In summary, the data from the fraudulent case SC-1903821 demonstrated the
lowest below zero AFINN-negScore (see Appendix K) value of -3 when evaluating 90
hits from comparing court case lexicons from the case and Twitter tweets having like
sentiments. In the same analysis, the AffectiveTweets collected the negative
SentiWordnet, resulting in the automatic annotation of all the synsets of WordNet with
notations of “positivity,” “negativity,” and “neutrality” (Baccianella, Esuli, & Sebastiani,
2010). In these instances, the tweet’s focus was placed upon negativity of -0.344,
signifying a minor threat. In comparison, the AFINN score yielded -3 and represented
words with a score that ran between -5 and 5, with negative scores indicating negative
sentiment and positive scores indicating positive sentiment (Silge & Robinson, 2020).
Moreover, the NRC attributes were derived from word-level emotion association lexicon
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for about 14,200 word types (Mohammad & Turney, 2013), which produced the lowest
recording with a HASH-SENT-negScore of -1.244.
Additionally, the identified behavioral theory added value when joined as part of
a comprehensive approach through the experiments. The outcome produced a common
theme shareable throughout the research, which allowed identifying areas of weakness in
a collective effort to detect the insider threat.
Lab Experiment 2: Artifact 2
The second lab experiment was identified by artifact ID 320-CR-00266. Unlike
the first experiment, a significant increase of court data was included. The United States
District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division provided data
from a case with 23 counts to scheme, artifice to defraud investors, and estimated in the
millions of dollars. According to Anderson (2020), the case involved engagement in
illegal activities relating to false financial statements, abetting, bank fraud, and wire
transfer fraud.
The following steps were executed to create the artifact, apply both court and
reporting notes, and connect to a specific behavioral theory. The distinguishing and
contrasting attributes beyond the first experiment came through additional data. Lab
Experiment 2 offered a 5-fold data increase. This dissertation study followed the GPFLE
process for Lab Experiment 2 and supplemented with the following activities: determine
artifact scores, tweet negative emotion scores, optimal classification, and artifact negative
summary. The detailed scores for Artifact 2 can be found in Table 4.

67
Table 4
Artifact 2 Detailed Scores
Attributes
Sentiment weight
Hits
NRC-AffectIntensity-AngerNRC-Hash-SentScore
posScore
NRC-Hash-SentnegScore
NRC-10-Anger
NRC-10-Trust
NRC-10-Negative
NRC-10-Positive
NRC-10-ExpandedAnger
NRC-10-ExpandedAnticipation
NRC-10-ExpandedDisgust
NRC-10-ExpandedFear
NRC-10-ExpandedJoy
NRC-10-Sadness
NRC-10-Surprise
NRC-10-Trust
NRC-10-ExpandedNegative
NRC-10-Expanded
Positive
SentiWordnetposScore
SentiWordnetnegScore
Mpqa-posCount
Mpqa-negCount
BingLiu-negCount
AFINN-posScore
AFINN-negScore
S140-posScore
S140-negScore

Minimum
-2.8
0
0
0
-4.99
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-.291
0
0
0
0
-1.174
0
-.18

Maximum
1.8
91
.394
1.066
0
1
1
1
1
.033
.198
.007
.021
.112
1
0
1
1
1
.175
0
1
1
1
2
0
.927
0

Mean
.247
23.122
.033
.098
-.229
.096
.201
.096
.21
.004
.014
.001
.004
.013
.044
0
.201
.096
.21
.01
-.083
.004
.105
.105
.672
-.328
.279
-.085

StdDev
1.006
25.461
.104
.227
.51
.295
.402
.295
.408
.008
.034
.002
.008
.027
.205
0
.402
.295
.408
.027
.08
.066
.307
.307
.489
.923
.291
.274

As in the previous experiment, WEKA continued to be an instrumental tool for
the study. The process tab provided various statistics for 27 attributes. The study used the
preprocess tab and created statistics for 27 attributes (see Table 4). The attributes
included values derived from “TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,”
“TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and
“TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector” filters. The most prominent tweet negative
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emotion (see Figure 11) scores are the four listed within the negative summary (see
Appendix K), and the same presented in an alternate view (see Figure 12).
Like Experiment 1, the study initially thought Naïve Bayes was the preferred
classifier within all lab experiments. However, after testing various classifiers, the study
selected the Trees Random Forest classification algorithm and applied this algorithm
against court data (see Figure 13), which provided a slightly lower score when compared
to the previous experiment, yet not a substantially lower percentage.

Figure 11. Artifact 2 Tweet negative emotion scores.
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Figure 12. Artifact 2 negative summary.
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Figure 13. Artifact 2 Trees Random Forest classification.
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Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.850
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s
weighted average scored a 0.009; exceptionally low. The non-weighted average for the
Precision was manually calculated at an average of 0.999 and appears considerably
higher than experiment one.
Although this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without values, this is
best explained by the class not having enough samples. Instances of zero-valued classes
accounted for two negative lexicons; liability and fraud. Class values greater than zero
and less than one accounted for no negative lexicons. And the last class with values equal
to one accounted for two lexicons limited, and hide; appearing in negative lexicon listings
(see Appendix R). Furthermore, this experiment’s classification of both zero-valued and
one-valued TPR classes might be identifiers with lexicons associated with fraud.
The recall is defined as the number of relevant items retrieved as a proportion of
all the relevant items that might potentially be retrieved (Walters, 2016) and in the
instance from this experiment, two classifications with two lexicons yielded no recall.
While the F-Measure effectively references the TP to the arithmetic mean of predicted
positives and real positives, being a constructed rate normalized in an idealized value
(Powers, 2020), with several instances undefined and was believed to be due zero TP
values within the limited data capture.
As in the preceding experiment, other classification details include MCC and FMeasure. Comparing to the previous experiment, the best explanation for MCC’s
unknown values was likely due to the comparatively small size of both positive and
negative records within the data. With the increase in data within subsequent experiments
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three through six, again it is postulated the numbers will not always remain as undefined.
Lastly, the examination of the ROC had a weighted average of 0.940. Fan, Upadhye, and
Worster’s (2006) general interpretation of the value is high discriminatory, and again;
anything higher and closer to 1.0 is very rare. Interestingly, the following experiments’
volume of data significantly increases, and class accuracies are further examined with the
expectancy to help postulate cohesions shared within all experiments.
Lastly, the ending component in the artifact creation required the examination of
relevant behavioral theories as applied to the court collected data. The following excerpt
provides an in-depth description on the case and Justice.gov (2020) stated the following:
The complaint and information, the defendant, 36, of San Francisco, California, is
alleged to have orchestrated multiple schemes to defraud his victims. The
defendant founded a venture capital company that he used between 2013 and
2016 to raise and manage four annual funds whose purpose was to invest in startup companies, and particularly companies in the field of virtual reality
technologies.
The information filed today alleges that the defendant partially funded his
capital commitment to the second of those funds by committing bank fraud.
Specifically, in 2014, the defendant made false statements about his wealth to his
bank while refinancing his home mortgage and while obtaining a $300,000
personal loan, and poured some of the ill-gotten money he obtained from the bank
into the second of his funds.
In 2015, the information alleges that the defendant took excess money in
venture capital fees from one of the funds he was raising and managing, and
therefore faced a shortfall at the end of the year that he did not wish to report to
his investors. At the end of 2015, the information alleges that the defendant
engaged in a scheme to defraud a bank by making false statements and
misrepresentations to the bank in order to obtain a $4 million line of credit to pay
back the fund from which he had taken excess fees. In so doing, the defendant
attempted to deceive his investors into believing the fund was well-managed and
was following the operating agreements the investors understood controlled the
management of the fund.
In February 2016, according to the allegations laid out in the information,
the defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud an investor with respect to a $2
million investment that it believed it was making directly into a virtual reality
content production company that the defendant contended he wholly-owned. It is
alleged that, rather than using that investment as he had represented, the defendant
used most of it for other purposes.
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The complaint then alleges that, in July 2016, the defendant engaged in a
scheme to defraud as many as five separate investors when he induced them to
wire a total of $1.35 million under the premise of investing in the untraded stock
of a privately-held software company. The complaint charges the defendant with
knowingly engaging in a scheme to defraud one investor by representing to that
organization that its money would be used to purchase the software company’s
shares. According to the complaint, on the same day the money was wired, the
defendant took the money from the bank account designed to make the investment
and sent it to a main operating bank account, from which it was used for many
purposes. The complaint alleges that no stock in the software company was ever
purchased.
Finally, the information sets out allegations about a series of investors as
to whom the defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud in 2015 and 2016 by
inducing their investments in his managed funds under the premise he would use
the money for investments in “frontier edge” technologies and take only certain
limited fees for the management of the funds. Instead, the defendant took more
fees than to which he was entitled and invested far less of the money he raised
than the operating agreements disclosed to the investors contemplated.
Today’s allegations in the criminal complaint and information state that
the evidence has established that since 2013, the defendant fraudulently obtained
at least $18.8 million through his illegal conduct. (p. 1)
After reviewing the court’s news release and reviewing the case as filed with the
courts from June 26, 2020, this particular case appeared to align with two behavioral
theories: the RAT and the TPB. As Cohen and Felson (1979) posited, unlawful activities
are brought together through conditions exhibited in this case, along with investors (the
targets) and lacked protectors to these types of criminal activities. Equally, the TPB
demonstrates the insufficiency of following any type of behavioral control, antecedents of
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control that lead to predictors with
intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991).
In these two instances with behavioral theories, the offender targeted investors
who were all naive to activities outside of their purview. Furthermore, the offender used
an elaborate strategy of being in control of many financial schemes that lacked any type
of checks and balances. The lack of behavioral norms accepted by society did not play a
role, which explains why TPB is in alignment with the outcome.

74
Lab Experiment 3: Artifact 3
The third lab experiment was identified by Artifact ID 320-CR-00245. Similar to
the last experiment’s volume of court data, the lexicons retrieved from this case yielded
an 18% hit rate increase over the previous experiment. The United States District Court,
Northern District of California, San Francisco Division provided data from a case with
multiple counts, including defrauding 21 financial institutions under false pretenses and
bank fraud.
Unlike previous experiments, a data conversion from OCR to PDF required an
additional step, which was outlined within the GPFLE process. This dissertation study
followed the same GPFLE process during Lab Experiment 3 and supplemented the
process with the following activities: determine artifact scores, tweet negative emotion
scores, optimal classification, and artifact negative summary.
This dissertation study used the WEKA preprocess tab and created statistics for
27 attributes (see Table 5) to include attributes with the lowest (see Appendix K) Tweet
negative emotion sentiment scores (see Figure 14). The attributes included values derived
from “TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,”
“TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and “TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector”
filters. An alternate view is presented (see Figure 15). Unlike prior experiments and
through manual testing various classifiers, Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes
(DMNB) was the selected classification. A concerted effort included manually selecting
other classifiers, but none fared better than DMNB when applied against the Twitter
tweets (see Figures 16–19). More importantly, the classifier correctly identified 94.79%,
and held a Kappa score of 0.9449.
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Table 5
Artifact 3 Detailed Scores
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

-3.2

3.1

.712

1.542

Hits

0

329

71.032

82.094

NRC-AffectIntensity-AngerScore

0

.882

.033

.133

NRC-Hash-SentposScore

0

5

.25

.482

NRC-Hash-SentnegScore

-4.999

0

-.382

.454

NRC-10-Anger

0

1

.064

.245

NRC-10-Trust

0

1

.106

.307

NRC-10-Negative

0

1

.122

.327

NRC-10-Positive

0

1

.209

.407

NRC-10-ExpandedAnger

0

.713

.026

.069

NRC-10-ExpandedAnticipation

0

.314

.063

.089

NRC-10-ExpandedDisgust

0

.464

.012

.035

NRC-10-ExpandedFear

0

.74

.024

.08

Sentiment weight
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Table 5
Artifact 3 Detailed Scores (continued)
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

NRC-10-ExpandedJoy

0

.724

.108

.217

NRC-10-Sadness

0

.807

.32

.119

NRC-10-Surprise

0

.149

.025

.043

NRC-10-Trust

0

.684

.118

.18

NRC-10-ExpandedNegative

0

.956

.076

.169

NRC-10-Expanded
Positive

0

.883

.207

.304

SentiWordnetposScore

0

1.539

.335

.476

SentiWordnetnegScore

-1.067

0

-.094

.221

Mpqa-posCount

0

1

.512

.5

Mpqa-negCount

0

1

.147

.354

BingLiu-negCount

0

1

.151

.358

AFINN-posScore

0

3

.795

.99

AFINN-negScore

-4

0

-.477

.938

S140-posScore

0

1.707

.32

.381

S140-negscore

-2.148

0

-.194

.407

Figure 14. Artifact 3 Tweet negative emotion scores.
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Figure 15. Artifact 3 negative summary.

Figure 16. Artifact 3 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes classification - Part 1.
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Figure 17. Artifact 3 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes - Part 2.
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Figure 18. Artifact 3 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes - Part 3.
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Figure 19. Artifact 3 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes - Part 4.
Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.948
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s
weighted average scored a 0.003; exceptionally low. The non-weighted average for the
Precision was manually calculated at an average of 0.958 and appears comparable to
experiment two.
Although this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without values, this is
likely due the inability to be assigned to the class, and not based the volume of data;
opposite of the previous experiment. Instances of zero-valued classes accounted for
eleven negative lexicons; felony, imposed, liability, losses, offenses, questioned,
suspended, victims, violation, violence, and weapon. Class values greater than zero and
less than one accounted for four negative lexicons; arrested, conspiracy, error, and
victim. And the last class with values equal to one accounted for fifteen lexicons abuse,
crime, criminal, dangerous, death, fraud, gross, guilty, injury, leave, loss, low, offense,
pay, and risk; appearing in negative lexicon listings (see Appendix S). Furthermore, this
experiment’s classification of all TPR classes might be identifiers with lexicons
associated with fraud and differ from the preceding experiments.
The takeaway from using DMNB within the experiment is the classifier provided
similar results for TPR classes having zero values, yet provided similar benefits when
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seeking negative social lexicons that could be associated with fraud. Moreover, DMNB
demonstrated an extremely low FPR and a high percentage of precision when properly
evaluated; not applicable across the board when both TPR and FPR values were zero.
Conjointly, the zero values for TPR and FPR impacted both F-Measure, and MCC, while
the weighted average for ROC was 0.999. This dissertation study did not expect these
results, yet it is posited the outcome is based on some data not being assigned to a class;
notably from previous experiments, the same held true. However, some lexicon class
attributes are conducive in vetting social media tweets and could help mitigate insider
threats from the most earliest onset.
Lastly, the ending component in the artifact creation required the examination of
relevant behavioral theories as applied to the court collected data. The following article
provides a summary of events. Fox Business (2014) stated the following:
A California man has pleaded guilty for his role in a nationwide automobile loan
fraud scheme the U.S. Secret Service discovered in Pennsylvania last year. The
defendant, 30, of Hercules, California, allegedly solicited straw purchasers and
then lied about their creditworthiness so the conspirators could obtain auto loans
that were never paid back. The crooks split the money among themselves, costing
21 victim banks and credit unions in several states $1 million to $2.4 million,
Assistant U.S. Attorney Marshall Piccinini told a federal judge Friday. Among
other things, the defendant faked borrowers' tax and wage documents and used
vehicle identification numbers from real cars that were not actually for sale.
Banks were told the loans were being used to pay for vehicles being sold by two
fictitious firms, Gold Coast Group Worldwide and AM Auto Groups. Banks lost
money because there was no real collateral to secure the loans. Philip pleaded
guilty before U.S. District Judge David Cercone in Pittsburgh because the scheme
was uncovered last year by U.S. Secret Service agents in Erie, about two hours
north of Pittsburgh. The Erie Federal Credit Union and Erie Community Credit
Union were among the financial institutions victimized, Piccinini said. The
prosecutor wouldn't say how many other people prosecutors believe were
involved in the scheme, only that the defendant is the first to be prosecuted.
Piccinini wouldn't say if others would be charged in Pennsylvania or other
jurisdictions where the fraud played out. In all, 64 phony borrowers attempted 150
bogus loans. Piccinini wouldn't say how many loans were successful, or how
many people in the scheme worked as "brokers," ''managers," or "processors" of

82
loans described in the charges filed against the defendant. The defendant
established bank accounts in the name of a phony firm, -- Investments Inc.,
through which some of the loan proceeds were moved. Investigators have traced
$544,000 from the scheme to the defendant’s bank accounts, but say at least
$219,000 of that was paid out to other participants. Piccinini wouldn't say what
may have happened to the rest of the money. The government is not seeking to
force the defendant to forfeit any money, which is often done in financial fraud
crimes, but he may be ordered to pay restitution to the banks when he's sentenced
Feb. 23. The defendant pleaded guilty to bank fraud and a separate count of
conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud. Both charges carry up to 30 years in
prison. (p. 1)
Review of the court’s case filed on June 19, 2020 appeared to align with two
behavioral theories: the RAT and the TPB. As in the previous experiment and applicable
is Cohen and Felson’s (1979) theory with unlawful activities coming together through
conditions exhibited in this case; along with banks and credit unions (the targets) and
lacked protectors to these types of criminal activities. Equally important, the TPB
demonstrates the insufficiency of following any type of behavioral control, antecedents of
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control that lead to predictors with
intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991), and appears to be demonstrated by greed.
In these two instances, the offenders appeared to target investors who were all
blind-eyed to activities outside of their knowledge using an elaborate strategy of being in
control of many financial schemes that lacked any type of checks and balances.
Lab Experiment 4: Artifact 4
The fourth lab experiment was identified by the artifact ID 4-15-CV-01490.
Although similar to prior experiments, the case differed by changing from a single
deceptive defendant to a business representing a different view of an entity’s fraudulent
activities. The experiment included an increase of volume with court data. The lexicons
retrieved from the case yielded a 38% hit rate increase over the previous experiment.
Like the previous experiment, data were retrieved from The United States District Court,
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Northern District of California. The San Francisco Division provided data from a
company that defrauded its customers with merchandise that did not meet the State’s
code for selling products with formaldehyde. According to USCourts.gov (2020)
Northern District of California:
The action arises from Defendants’ unlawful, unfair, fraudulent and misleading
advertising, marketing and selling of their Chinese-manufactured laminate
flooring (“laminate flooring”) to consumers in California as compliant with
formaldehyde emission standards promulgated by the California Air Resources
Board (“CARB”). Defendants engaged in and continue to engage in this
misleading advertising campaign in an effort to deceive consumers into
purchasing its laminate flooring products. In fact, the products contain and emit
formaldehyde at levels in excess of CARB standards. Formaldehyde, a colorless
gas, is a substance known to cause cancer. The National Toxicology Program
within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has classified
formaldehyde as a known human carcinogen. Formaldehyde exposure in the
short-term can cause irritation of the skin, eyes, nose, and throat, respiratory
problems such as asthma, and neurological impairment. Long-term exposure to
formaldehyde can result in an increased risk of developing certain types of cancer.
Children and the elderly are at a heightened risk from formaldehyde exposure.
Putting profits ahead of safety, the company specifically recommends its laminate
flooring for consumers who have children. “Laminate flooring is recommended
for an environment where the ‘challenges’ of children and pets exist, and it is not
significantly noisier than other hard flooring surfaces. (p. 2–3)
Just as the previous experiment required a data conversion from PDF using OCR,
the same was applied to this experiment. The documents appeared to be scanned from
within the courts and into an electronic format, with many pages not correctly aligned
during the scanning process and required the use of OCR software.
This dissertation study continued to follow the same GPFLE process for Lab
Experiment 4. This process was supplemented with the successive activities in capturing
all sentiment attributes (see Table 6), with the lowest negative sentiment scores (see
Appendix K) and validation using the Naïve Bayes classification. The attributes included
values derived from “TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,”
“TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and
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“TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector” filters. As expected, four negative sentiments
scored low and yielded a score of -2.08, whereas the S140-negScore and the NRC-HashSent-negScores both yielded a score of -4.999 (see Figure 20). An alternate view is also
presented with the negative summary (see Figure 21).
Table 6
Artifact 4 Detailed Scores
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

-3.4

3.2

.424

1.006

Hits

0

1007

178.555

25.461

NRC-AffectIntensity-AngerScore

0

.667

.018

.104

NRC-Hash-SentposScore

0

1.416

.142

.227

NRC-Hash-SentnegScore

-4.999

0

-.325

.51

NRC-10-Anger

0

1

.039

.295

NRC-10-Trust

0

1

.099

.402

NRC-10-Negative

0

1

.092

.295

NRC-10-Positive

0

1

.153

.408

Sentiment weight
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Table 6
Artifact 4 Detailed Scores (continued)
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

NRC-10-ExpandedAnger

0

.746

.076

.008

NRC-10-ExpandedAnticipation

0

.285

.061

.034

NRC-10-ExpandedDisgust

0

.384

.067

.002

NRC-10-ExpandedFear

0

.875

.048

.008

NRC-10-ExpandedJoy

0

.39

.053

.027

NRC-10-Sadness

0

.72

.059

.205

NRC-10-Surprise

0

.132

.027

0

NRC-10-Trust

0

.684

.087

.402

NRC-10-ExpandedNegative

0

.982

.267

.295

NRC-10-Expanded
Positive

0

.883

.148

.408

SentiWordnetposScore

0

1.539

.255

.027

SentiWordnetnegScore

-.208

0

-.184

.08

Mpqa-posCount

0

1

.552

.066

Mpqa-negCount

0

1

.152

.307

BingLiu-negCount

0

1

.126

.307

AFINN-posScore

0

3

.729

.489

AFINN-negScore

-4

0

-.432

.923

S140-posScore

0

3.614

.22

.291

S140-negscore

-4.999

0

-.372

.274

The preceding attributes represents the direct correlations between sentiment
found in court cases that is paired to known negative sentiments used in the GPFLE
process and content extracted from Tweets. Thus, one can hypothesize that negative
sentiment associated with forms of fraud can be extracted from social media, as shown in
the collective experiments’ output.
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Figure 20. Artifact 4 Tweet negative emotion scores.

Figure 21. Artifact 4 negative summary.

The Naïve Bayes classification score was average when compared with other
experiments (see Figures 22–27) and correctly identified the classification instances 70%
of the time. The important takeaway was the overall average for all experiments’
classification rather than this particular classification results. In this instance, instead of
using the Auto-WEKA package, manually testing classifiers led to Naïve Bayes as the
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best option and produced fair results with the accuracy of classifications and a Kappa
score of 0.6822.

Figure 22. Artifact 4 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 1.

Figure 23. Artifact 4 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 2.
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Figure 24. Artifact 4 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 3.
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Figure 25. Artifact 4 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 4.
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Figure 26. Artifact 4 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 5.

Figure 27. Artifact 4 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 6.
Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.700
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s
weighted average scored a 0.005; comparable to the previous experiment. The weighted
average for the Precision was 0.736 and appears lower than other experiments, but
reasonable.
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Again, this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without values; no
positive data. Some instances with zero-valued classes accounted for twenty-eight
negative lexicons; cancer, complained, complaint, complaints, deceive, deceived, delay,
denying, excluded, fail, failing, fails, faulty, lawsuit, misleading, offends, oppressive,
questioned, refused, suffer, suffered, unaware, unethical, unfair, violate, violation,
violations, and warn. Class values greater than zero and less than one accounted for
twenty-four negative lexicons; attacks, cut, devastating, exposed, failed, hard, harm,
immoral, injured, injury, lies, limited, lost, low, lower, no, problems, punish, refuse, risk,
risks, scare, trouble, and wrong. And the last class with values equal to one accounted six
lexicons demand, fight, fraud, illegal, lowering, and touted (see Appendix T).
Unlike previous experiments, this experiment supplied more data; 5,926 class
instances. Because of this, the total number of undefined TPR and FPR results did not
exist; only zero values. In turn, the calculations for Recall, F-Measure, MCC, and ROC
was possible. For these attributes, the following outcome was likely. First, the weighted
averages for Recall yielded 0.700 and considered good in terms of correctly labeling
lexicons. Second, the F-Measure yielded 0.713; acceptable. Third, the MCC yielded
0.709, not a complete agreement but nearest to 1.0 and acceptable. The ROC yielded
0.994 as its optimal threshold of false positives. The supportive outcome provided the
identification of lexicon classes conducive in vetting social media tweets and could help
mitigate insider threats from the most earliest onset.
Lastly, the impact of Artifact 4 included both business partners and consumers
and appeared to fall within two theories. The theory of reasoned action (TRA) is used to
reveal the meaningful effects of attitudes and subjective norms. In this particular case, the
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business appeared to follow a subjective norm common with other business owners’
practices. The behavior is in alignment with Hale, Householder and Greene’s (2002)
assessment to subjective norms. Similarly, the business specifically sought suitable
targets in the absence of guardians against crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979) in order to
carry out their business practices and part of the routine activity theory (RAT).
Lab Experiment 5:Artifact 5
Lab Experiment 5 was identified by Artifact I.D. 3-16-cv-02600. This experiment
demonstrated an example of fraud with a deceptive business practice, posing a threat to
consumers and business partners. In this instance, a corporation knowingly practiced a
deceptive business model to increase its profits. A comparison of the experiment’s data
collection to other samples places the volume of data inline to several other experiments
with 33 pages of court-produced documents.
Data were retrieved from The United States District Court, Northern District of
Illinois. The Northern District provided data from a class-action lawsuit that alleged an
automotive manufacturer violated the Clean Air Act and EPA guidelines through the
selling of faulty vehicles as part of a much larger scheme to deceive EPA testing
procedures. According to USCourts.gov (2020) Northern District of Illinois:
Any person to manufacture or sell, or offer to sell, or install, any part or
component intended for use with, or as part of, any motor vehicle engine, where a
principal effect of the part or component is to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative
any device or element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor
vehicle engine in compliance with regulations under this subchapter, and where
the person knows or should know that such part or component is being offered for
sale or installed for such use or put to such use. (p. 5)
This dissertation study followed the same GPFLE process in Lab Experiment 5
and supplemented the process with the successive activities in capturing all sentiment
attributes (see Table 7) with the lowest tweet negative emotion scores (see Figure 28) and
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validation using the OneR classification. The attributes included values derived from
“TweetToInputLexiconFeatureVector,” “TweetToLexiconFeatureVector,”
“TweetToWordListCountFeatureVector,” and “TweetToSentiStrengthFeatureVector”
filters. All provided the following results and expanded with further granularity.
Analogous to previous experiments, four negative (see Appendix K) sentiments scored
low, producing an NRC-Hash-Sent-negScore of -4.999. Equally, the SentiWordnetnegScore (-1.696), S140-negScore (-2.41), and AFINN-negScore (-4) was comparable to
other experiments. An alternate view (see Figure 29) is also presented and shows the
lowest four negative sentiment score summary.
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Table 7
Artifact 5 Detailed Scores
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

-2.8

3.2

1.019

1.391

Hits

0

1771

344.527

428.429

NRC-AffectIntensity-AngerScore

0

.75

.007

.053

NRC-Hash-SentposScore

0

3.117

.231

.39

NRC-Hash-SentnegScore

-4.999

0

-.27

.413

NRC-10-Anger

0

1

.017

.129

NRC-10-Trust

0

1

.161

.367

NRC-10-Negative

0

1

.057

.232

NRC-10-Positive

0

1

.22

.414

NRC-10-ExpandedAnger

0

.686

.096

.116

NRC-10-ExpandedAnticipation

0

.404

.051

.086

NRC-10-ExpandedDisgust

0

.728

.146

.185

NRC-10-ExpandedFear

0

.727

.111

.153

NRC-10-ExpandedJoy

0

.724

.083

.184

NRC-10-Sadness

0

.807

.07

.108

NRC-10-Surprise

0

.149

.032

.035

NRC-10-Trust

0

.472

.065

.106

NRC-10-ExpandedNegative

0

.985

.337

.383

Sentiment weight
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Table 7
Artifact 5 Detailed Scores (continued)
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

NRC-10-Expanded
Positive

0

.877

.156

.27

SentiWordnetposScore

0

2.586

.698

.827

SentiWordnetnegScore

-1.696

0

-.084

.173

Mpqa-posCount

0

1

.628

.483

Mpqa-negCount

0

1

.05

.219

BingLiu-negCount

0

1

.047

.211

AFINN-posScore

0

3

1.376

1.119

AFINN-negScore

-4

0

-.294

.593

S140-posScore

0

2.064

.334

.45

S140-negscore

-2.41

0

-.198

.374

The results represent the direct correlations between sentiment found in court
cases that is paired to known negative sentiments used in the GPFLE process and content
extracted from Tweets. Thus, one can hypothesize that negative sentiment associated
with forms of fraud can be extracted from social media, as shown in the collective
experiments’ output.
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Figure 28. Artifact 5 Tweet negative emotion scores.

Figure 29. Artifact 5 negative summary.
The outcome classification scored compared slightly better than the previous
experiment; Naïve Bayes (see Figures 30 –35) and correctly identified the classification
instances 78% of the time. Like other experiments, the study continued to manually test
various classifications and opted to use the Naïve Bayes classification.
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Figure 30. Artifact 5 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 1

Figure 31. Artifact 5 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 2.
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Figure 32. Artifact 5 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 3.
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Figure 33. Artifact 5 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 4.
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Figure 34. Artifact 5 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 5.

Figure 35. Artifact 5 Naïve Bayes classification – Part 6.
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Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.780
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s
weighted average scored a 0.004; comparable to the previous experiment. The weighted
average with the Precision was undetermined through the automated process within
WEKA and manual calculation with TPR / (TPR + FPR) produced an average of 0.995;
acceptable, but the appears to be slightly higher than previous experiments, but
comparable to experiment 3.
Like other experiments, this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers without
values, and could represent no corresponding class assignments. For instance, zerovalued classes accounted for thirty-six negative lexicons; avoided, burdens, complaint,
deceive, deceived, deception, delay, dispute, disregard, excluded, exploiting, failures,
futile, grossly, harmed, harsh, hoax, immoral, inability, liability, losses, misleading,
offend, punish, reckless, sluggish, touted, uncertain, unethical, unfair, unjust, victims,
violated, violation, and violations. Class values greater than zero and less than one
accounted for eight negative lexicons; burden, confusion defeat, delay, difficult, failed,
failure, and fraud. And the last class with values equal to one accounted six negative
lexicons; alone, illegal, injury, negative, and pay (see Appendix U). Also, this
experiment’s classification of all TPR classes might be identifiers with lexicons
associated with fraud and differ from the preceding experiments.
Although this experiment supplied more data with 7,515 class instances, the
outcome provided an explanation as to specific attributes set to undefined. The initial
assessment postulated the lack of data caused similar results in previous experiments. In
this instance, that is not the case. Having more data did not prove to be more beneficial,
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and it is believed the disparity is a result from the type of data being processed, same
overall court system, but a uniqueness in content. Further examination has shown the
weighted averages for Precision, F-Measure, and MCC was uncalculated; some data
could not be assigned to a given class.
For these attributes, the following outcome was possible. First, the weighted
averages for Recall yielded 0.780 and like the previous experiment considered good in
terms of correctly labeling lexicons. Second, ROC yielded 0.995 as its optimal threshold
of false positives. The supportive outcome provided the identification of some lexicon
classes conducive in vetting social media tweets and could help mitigate insider threats
from the most earliest onset.

103
The theories that correlate best with this case are protection motivation theory
(PMT) and routine activity theory (RAT). Protection motivation theory represents the
cognitive processes to mediate the persuasive effects of a fear appeal by arousing
protection motivation. In this case, it appears dwindling sales was a motivation and
according to Maddux and Rogers (1983), the protection motivation came from selfpreservation with keeping the business afloat. Furthermore, one could theorize the danger
felt by the manufacturer might be construed with the fear from competitors and led to the
business finding suitable targets, the consumer and in alignment with RAT.
Lab Experiment 6: Artifact 6
Experiment 6 was identified by Artifact ID 3-16-CV-01547. In this case, an
employee of a business exhibited fraudulent practices. As in the previous instance, the
study leveraged an all-encompassing and differing angle for fraud through an employee
associated with the banking industry. The experiment included an increase of
classifications over the previous experiment, yet similarities was discovered through
court data.
Data were retrieved from The United States District Court, Southern District of
California. The Southern District provided data from a bank that demonstrated a former
contractor’s unwillingness to return the bank’s laptop and its proprietary software. In
addition to the contractor’s possession of the laptop came threats to sell the bank’s private
and sensitive information to anyone willing to pay the highest price. According to
USCourts.gov (2020) Southern District of California:
The Bank seeks immediate injunctive relief from this Court to compel Deaver to
refrain from disclosing and selling any of the Bank’s trade secret information and
to order him to return to the Bank the property that he literally stole. The Bank
will be irreparably harmed if Deaver is not ordered to return the laptop and source

104
code that he stole and claims to have provided and disclosed to third parties. If
there is a case worthy of a temporary restraining order to stop the criminal
conduct of a rogue contractor who is intent on carrying out his criminal threats,
this is it. (p. 2)
Just as earlier experiments required a data conversion from PDF using OCR, the
same was applied to this experiment. The documents appeared to be scanned from within
the courts and into an electronic format, with many pages not correctly aligned during the
scanning process and required the use of OCR software.
This dissertation study followed the GPFLE process for Lab Experiment 6 and
supplemented the process with the successive activities in capturing all sentiment
attributes (see Table 8) with the lowest negative sentiment scores from the most
prominent scores (see Figure 36). An alternate summary view (see Figure 37) is also
presented and shows the lowest four negative sentiment scores and validation using the
DMNB classification (see Figures 38-43). A common theme between experiments was
the four negative (see Appendix K) sentiment scores. For example, the S140-negScore (2.148), AFINN-negScore (-4.0), SentiWordnet-negScore (-2.148), and NRC-Hash-SentnegScore (-4.999).
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Table 8
Artifact 6 Detailed Scores
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

-3.2

3.1

.712

1.542

Hits

0

239

71.032

82.094

NRC-AffectIntensity-AngerScore

0

.882

.033

.133

NRC-Hash-SentposScore

0

5

.025

.482

NRC-Hash-SentnegScore

-4.999

0

-.382

.454

NRC-10-Anger

0

1

.064

.245

NRC-10-Trust

0

1

.106

.307

NRC-10-Negative

0

1

.122

.327

NRC-10-Positive

0

1

.209

.407

Sentiment weight
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Table 8
Artifact 6 Detailed Scores (continued)
Attributes

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

StdDev

NRC-10-ExpandedAnger

0

.713

.026

.069

NRC-10-ExpandedAnticipation

0

.314

.063

.089

NRC-10-ExpandedDisgust

0

.464

.012

.035

NRC-10-ExpandedFear

0

.74

.24

.08

NRC-10-ExpandedJoy

0

.724

.108

.217

NRC-10-Sadness

0

.807

.32

.119

NRC-10-Surprise

0

.149

.025

.043

NRC-10-Trust

0

.684

.118

.18

NRC-10-ExpandedNegative

0

.956

.076

.169

NRC-10-Expanded
Positive

0

.883

.207

.304

NRC-10SentiWordnetposScore

0

1.539

.335

.476

NRC-10SentiWordnetnegScore

-1.067

0

-.094

.221

Mpqa-posCount

0

1

.512

.5

Mpqa-negCount

0

1

.147

.354

BingLiu-negCount

0

1

.151

.358

AFINN-posScore

0

3

.795

.99

AFINN-negScore

-4

0

-.477

.938

S140-posScore

0

1.707

.32

.381

S140-negscore

-2.148

0

-.194

.407

The results represent the direct correlations between sentiment found in court
cases that is paired to known negative sentiments used in the GPFLE process and content
extracted from Tweets. Thus, one can hypothesize that negative sentiment associated
with forms of fraud exists within social media.
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Figure 36. Artifact 6 Tweet negative emotion scores.

The classification scored comparatively better than the previous experiment,
correctly identified the classification instances 92% of the time, and yielded a Kappa
score of 0.9257. The important takeaway from these results is the overall average for the
classifications of all experiments rather than this set of results.

Figure 37. Artifact 6 negative summary.
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Figure 38. Artifact 6 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes classification – Part 1.

Figure 39. Artifact 6 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes classification – Part 2.
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Figure 40. Artifact 6 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes classification – Part 3.

110

Figure 41. Artifact 6 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes classification – Part 4.
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Figure 42. Artifact 6 Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes classification – Part 5.
Within the context of this experiment, the TPR’s weighted average came to 0.929
and considered acceptable when comparing a perfect rate of 1.0. In contrast, the FPR’s
weighted average scored a 0.002; comparable to other experiments. Like the previous
experiment, the weighted average with Precision was undetermined through the
automated process within WEKA and manual calculation with TPR / (TPR + FPR)
produced an average of 0.492; although this might be acceptable, the value is definitely
lower than previous experiments.
As in other experiments, this experiment produced TPR and FPR numbers
without values, and represents instances where the data cannot be assigned to a class.
Instances of zero-valued classes accounted for twenty-four negative lexicons; abuse,
avoided, complained, complaint, demanded, demanding, destruction, disregard, hacked,
harmed, preventing, refused, refusing restricting, suspected, threatened, threatens,
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threats, unacceptable, unethical, unjust, violate, violated, and violation. Class values
greater than zero and less than one accounted for seven negative lexicons; destroying,
failing, failure, lawsuit, steal, suffered, and threatening. The last class with values equal
to one accounted for twelve negative lexicons; alone, crime, criminal, damage, demand,
destroy, difficult, failed, fraud, gross, harm, and illegal (see Appendix V). Also, this
experiment’s classification of all TPR classes might be identifiers with lexicons
associated with fraud and differ from the preceding experiments.
Analogous to the previous experiment, similarities exist in the failure to compute
the weighted averages for the Precision, F-Measure, and MCC; all attributed to some of
the data. Initially, it was believed to be caused by the lack of data, but in this instance, it
appears to be related to instances not being able to have class assignments. Additionally,
the weighted average for Recall at 0.929 and ROC of 0.997; an optimal threshold.
Correspondingly to other experiments interpretation with behavioral theories,
RAT best applies to this case. In this instance, the contractor appeared to knowingly
select a target thought to be incapable of defending itself, which revealed the absence of
capable guardians against crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979). However, what the contractor
did not realize at the time was the bank’s trade secrets on the laptop and the willingness
to prosecute based on theft.
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Findings
Based on known and well-established negative sentiments, the study revealed that
the fraudulent sentiments that exist in the legal system also exist in social media. This
dissertation study applied an identical methodology in each lab experiment and found
cynical sentiments within the publicly available Twitter tweets, correlation to unique and
negative social media lexicons with attributes from a fraudulent context, and documented
within the legal system from cases involving some degree of fraud. While some lab
experiments either experienced a lack of data or data not assigned with the listed classes,
many instances held values supportive to the outcome (see Appendix Q, R, S, T, U, and
V).
The upfront notation to use Auto-WEKA to select the best classification
algorithm was not the best option and was changed due to precisions of correctly
identifying instances within the experiments. The experiments used three classifications:
Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, and DMNB. Although this dissertation study experienced
technical challenges earlier in the research; for instance, an essential WEKA plug-in kept
causing problems, yet the problems were overcome. Other time-intensive operations
appeared unique because the research operated within one physical location and did not
leverage cloud-based technologies.
Each experiment’s ending required a case review from each set of court
documents. These case reviews were paired to one or more behavioral theories and found
six cases that aligned with the RAT, two cases that aligned with the TPB, one case that
aligned with the TRA, and one case that aligned with the protection motivation theory.
Not all anticipated theories were applicable, yet this dissertation study found one
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behavioral theory to be more prevalent in many lab experiments. RAT appeared to touch
all aspects of court cases. This study’s findings confirmed Cohen and Felson’s (1979)
behavioral theory was demonstrated through criminal acts coming down to a merging of
offenders and targets, the element of timing, and not having any forms of protection
against criminal activities become relevant predictors.
Summary of Results
Sentiment scoring to include relevant behavioral theories, classification variables,
and exercise specific data (see Table 9) is outlined. All experiments shared three core
commonalities; all relatable to RAT, used Hutto and Gilbert’s (2014) 7,063 sentiment
lexicons, and all accessed the same 20,000 Twitter tweets. Experiments 2-6 reached the
lower negative NRC-Hash-SentnegScore of -4.990; nearly the lowest possible value of 5.0. Within the context of negativity, this represents tweets of sadness, anger, fear, or
disgust and is outlined in Bravo-Marquez et al.’s (2015) works (see Appendix K).
Experiments 3,5, and 6 produced the lowest scoring for SentWordnet-negScore,
and according to Baccianella et al. (2010), the correlation related to the top-ranked
negative synsets. Similarly, experiments 1,3,4,5, and 6 showed a fair amount of
negativity in the AFINN-negScore with a low value of -4.0. Furthermore, the S140negScore for experiments 3-6 appeared to demonstrate negativity in emotion-aware
tweets.
Also, all experiments included various classifications, including Trees Random
Forest, Naïve Bayes, and Discriminative Multinomial Naïve Bayes. Kappa values within
each experiment provided greater accuracy and according to Sahoo’s (2013) findings,
finer accuracy is achieved when values are higher than zero. Experiments 1,2,3, and 6
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showed nearly perfect agreements with Kappa (see Appendix M) and experiments 4 and
5 demonstrated substantial agreements.
Examining each experiment’s TPR, provided acceptable values and representative
of positive classes correctly classified by a model is achieved (Azar et al., 2014) with
experiments 1-6 yielding the following respective values of 0.873, 0.850, 0.948, 0.700,
0.780, and 0.929. In contrast, the FPR represents the fraction of negative classes that are
identified as positive, and in these instances, all experiments appeared to score
exceptionally low. All six experiments yielded the following respective values of 0.039,
0.009, 0.003, 0.005, 0.004, and 0.002. Ideally, the class precision’s weighted averages
would have been closer to 1.0 and represent the exactness of a classifier (Kaur & Saini,
2015) and correlate to fewer false positives. In half the experiments, 1,4, and 6, the FPR
came to 0.539, 0.736, and 0.492. Conversely, experiments 2,3, and 5 yielded 0.999,
0.958, and 0.995.
The uniqueness between experiments is directly contributed to the content within
the obtained legal documents. While each court case had anywhere between 1 and 36
pages of transcripts, it appears each showed relevance in the number of collected
instances processed by the classifiers. For example, each respective experiment yielded
157, 206, 1,846, 5,926, 7,515, and 3,269 records of data. The overall holistic capture of
data appears to provide a glimpse into the value of traversing tweets to identify possible
insider threats. Furthermore, while limited in scope to fraudulent cases, there appears to
be relevancy when examining data within the legal system and finding likenesses within
publicly available tweets. And lastly, organizations could leverage these findings within
the preemployment vetting of future employees and business associates.
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Table 9
Summary of Results
Attribute

Description

Ex 1

Ex 2

Ex 3

Ex 4

Ex 5

Ex 6

NRC-Hash-SentnegScore

Sadness,
anger, fear,
and disgust

-1.244

-4.990

-4.990

-4.990

-4.990

-4.990

SentiWordnetnegScore

Top ranked
negative
synsets

-0.344

-0.291

-1.067

-0.208

-1.696

-1.067

AFINN-negScore

Slang,
obscene
words, web
jargon

-3.000

-1.174

-4.000

-4.000

-4.000

-4.000

S140-negScore

Emotion
aware
negative
tweets

-0.180

-0.180

-2.148

-4.990

-2.410

-2.148

Theory

Applicable
theory

RAT

RAT/TPB

RAT/TPB

Instances

Records of
data

157

206

1,846

Classification

Applied
classifier

Trees
random
forest

Kappa

Kappa score

0.8055

0.8106

0.9449

0.6822

0.7588

0.9257

TPR

True positive
rate

0.873

0.850

0.948

0.700

0.780

0.929

FPR

False
positive rate

0.039

0.009

0.003

0.005

0.004

0.002

Precision

Precision

0.539

0.999

0.958

0.736

0.995

0.492

Negative sentiment Maximum
lexicons
available

7,063

7,063

7,063

7,063

7,063

7,063

Twitter tweets

Maximum
available

20,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

Legal documents

Pages

1

22

23

36

33

23

Negative Classes

Lexicons

2

4

30

58

48

43

RAT/TRA RAT/PMT
5,926

7,515

RAT
3,269

Trees random Discriminative Naïve Bayes Naïve Bayes Discriminative
forest
multinomial
multinomial
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusions
This dissertation study found correlations from data extracted from both fraud and
social media inputs. The benefits of machine learning, in-depth analysis of data, and
coupling of theories that elaborated on behavioral aspects with insider threat mindsets
(see Figure 43) produced evidence that proved beneficial in mitigating an insider threat at
an early onset.

Figure 43. Prevalent theories.
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Conversely, this dissertation study aimed to gather evidence to meet the
objectives created by the IT artifacts in proving useful in threat predictions (see Figure
44). Three objectives; first, aimed to draw on correlations between negative sentiments
found in various fraudulent cases and the same lexicons found in social media tweets.
The goal within this context was to provide a preemployment vetting tool to identify
individuals showing similarities with insider threat behaviors. Second, aimed to go
beyond natural language processing’s shortcomings to find commonalities fraudulent
contexts within all lab experiments, including behavioral theories common and
paramount among all fraudulent cases. And third, the analysis of relevant data attributed
with varying degrees of fraud.

Figure 44. Multiple case summary.
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This dissertation study contributed to positive outcomes; however, limitations
surfaced. First, focus was exclusively on English content from fraudulent cases and
collected social inputs from Tweets. A more elaborate study could build upon threats in
other languages and pull data from Instagram, YouTube, or similar platforms. Second,
fraud-related insider threats only scratch the surface with a few types of threats. Other
forms of insider threats could include other forms of white-collar crimes. According to
H.G. Legal Resources (2020), other forms of crimes include the following:
Insurance fraud including automotive insurance, homeowner insurance, medical
insurance and Medicaid insurance may all involve people who attempt to commit
fraud. Insider trading, securities fraud, hedge fund fraud and stock manipulation
are white collar crimes that may be committed when stocks or bonds are involved.
Computer fraud, wire fraud and mail fraud may also be the result of white-collar
crimes. White collar crimes also include identity theft, mortgage broker fraud,
bribery, embezzlement, and tax evasion. These crimes are some of the most
common types of white-collar crimes. These crimes all have the similarity that the
ultimate goal is to receive some type of economic or financial gain. (para. 4)
Third, the initial assessment gravitated in using Facebook as a significant source
of inputs; however, during testing with sample data, the source did not produce sufficient
data for analysis. At that time, Twitter was selected and required additional time for
approvals. This dissertation study applied for developer’s access and waited weeks for
approval, which delayed the research process. In hindsight, the approval process should
have been initiated earlier in the research process. Fourth, the lab experiments provided
insight into answering the research questions.
Research Question 1 asked: Was there sufficient literature on insider threat
mitigation strategies? The answer to this question was yes. This dissertation study
gathered a fair amount of literature that was published between 2013 and 2019. The
literature covered three core areas examined by the study and included monitoring and
profiling, rulemaking and policies, and employment vetting.
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Under the umbrella of monitoring and profiling, Cole (2015) pointed out the
majority of current mitigation efforts include monitoring of both internal and external
networks. In this instance, Cappelli et al. (2009) found the level of practicality did not
appear the best solution for an institution, while Kühn et al. (2017) found any benefits
with monitoring events not fruitful when dealing with the analysis from intrusiondetection monitoring. Supportive to a monitoring analysis, Benferhat et al. (2013)
suggested when dealing with a dynamic and changing environment, referencing a
baseline can become an ineffective approach. In other instances, Shaw (2006) discovered
supervisors required the knowledge to know whether or not an employee is disgruntled
through evaluating risk factors and became apparent there is a delay within the mitigation
strategy. Comparatively, Hubballi and Suryanarayanan (2014) delved deep into missing
key alerts through false negatives within SIEM technologies. Furthermore, Vilendečić et
al. (2017) suggested key implementations within SIEM required lowering false-positives
or preventive action cannot be taken at the right time (Ambre & Shekokar, 2015).
As the literature suggests, policy enforcement does very little in terms of
changing employees’ mindsets. For instance, literature has demonstrated Acceptable Use
Policies are fairly common, yet becomes worthless if employees do not become aware of
them (Alshboul & Streff, 2017) and Gallagher et al. (2015) suggested an inadequate
implementation will not alter users’ postures towards insider threat preventions. Linkov
et al. (2019) theorized policies that are over and under-regulated can become exploitable.
Antoniou et al. (1999) suggested competing principles can drive conflicts, then promote
an unclear direction to employees who rely on voluntary compliance and cooperation
(Pelton, 2017). Moreover, according to Bauer (2017), despite having policies in place at
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an organizational level, employees intentionally are noncompliant; due to carelessness,
poor knowledge, or clear intention to act dishonestly (Nawawi & Salin, 2018).
The literature on employee vetting is the basis for this study and some approaches
were demonstrated within failures within current vetting practices. According to Kühn
and Nieman (2017), flaws can be contributed to the over-reliance of information
collected from the employee, and regardless of the layers of vetting, people still pass
through the process. Lomas (2019) discovered personnel responsible for vetting officials
is flawed, along with Jeske et al.’s (2019) findings of faults with voluntary employee
disclosures; not solidify sound practices (Hielscher & Waghorn, 2015). Lastly, Roulin
and Bourdage (2017) discovered it is possible to uncover personality traits during the
interviewing process, while Maasberg et al. (2015) postulated negative attitudes, triggers,
motives, malicious intent, and motives are security concerns that need to be addressed.
All reviewed literature directly supports insider threat mitigation attempts from the past
and all relevant to the outcome of this study.
In summary, non-behavioral literature reviews spanned approximately 400
articles and selected the top 55 to cover 1999, through 2020, while behavioral literature
included six theories dating back to 1979. All literature encompassed a multitude of
content directly related to what has and has not worked within insider threat mitigation
strategies. Ultimately, published works from Park, You, and Lee (2018) led this
dissertation study to further examine sentiment exposed in social media.
Research Question 2 asked: Was there relevance in behavioral theories, court
transcripts from fraudulent cases, and social inputs that can solve the problem with the
research? First, the existences of different behavioral theories were discovered within
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each lab experiment, all aligned to fraud-related court cases, and shared one common
behavioral theory; RAT (see Figure 43). In experiment one, the defendant situated
himself into the trusted CEO position without mechanisms in place to prevent the
embezzlement, and waited for the opportune time to execute the fraudulent act. In
subsequent experiments, the defendants defrauded investors with various schemes and
included fictitious businesses establishing collaborators such as managers, brokers, and
processors to cover all aspects of the crime, all without protectors. In another instance, a
contractor attempted to keep property belonging to a bank, and in all instances appeared
to demonstrate an alignment to criminal acts requires convergence in space and time of
likely offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardians against crime
(Cohen & Felson, 1979).
Second, the lessor behavioral theory; Theory of Planned Behavior appeared in
experiments two, three, and four to demonstrate the insufficiency of following any type
of behavioral control, antecedents of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived
behavioral control that leads to predictors with intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991).
Furthermore, the Theory of Reasoned Action appeared in experiment four, and the
Protection Motivation Theory appeared in experiment five (see Appendix X). In these
instances, it appears through the knowledge of the preceding behavioral theories, there
are likely ways organizations could mitigate the insider threat by implementing strategies
to predict what people might do.
Third, just as behavioral theories drawn from fraudulent court cases showed a
significant value, the collecting of social input data from Twitter tweets provided
supplemental inputs. The AffectiveTweets package scored with Bravo et al.’s (2015)
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NRC-Hash-Sent-negScore, Baccianella et al.’s (2010) SentiWordnet-negScore, Bravo’s
AFINN-negScore, and Bandhakavi et al.’s (2018) S140-negScoreAFIN (see Appendix K)
to demonstrate relevancy within each experiment’s output (see Table 10).
Table 10
AffectiveTweets Scores
Attribute

Description

Ex 1

Ex 2

Ex 3

Ex 4

Ex 5

Ex 6

NRC-Hash-Sent- Sadness,
negScore
anger, fear,
and disgust

-1.244

-4.990

-4.990

-4.990

-4.990

-4.990

SentiWordnetnegScore

Top ranked
negative
synsets

-0.344

-0.291

-1.067

-0.208

-1.696

-1.067

AFINN-negScore Slang,
obscene
words, web
jargon

-3.000

-1.174

-4.000

-4.000

-4.000

-4.000

S140-negScore

-0.180

-0.180

-2.148

-4.990

-2.410

-2.148

Emotion
aware
negative
tweets

In summary, there appears to be relevance in mitigating insider threats through
the use of negative sentiment associated within the fraudulent context of social media.
Furthermore, the discovery of repetitive behavioral theories might imply preventive
measures to possible insider threats are probable.
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Research Question 3 asked: What behavioral theories are most applicable to the
research? Out of all behavioral theories, this dissertation study found the Routine Activity
Theory common between the lab experiments. This research concurs with works by
Cohen and Felson (1979) and the culmination of a suitable target, motivated offender,
and the lack of an authority figure, allows criminal behaviors to develop. In every
fraudulent case, Cohen and Felson’s theory is in alignment with the events leading to the
actions of the insider threat (see Appendix Y).
Research Question 4 asked: Can IT artifacts be created from the information
obtained in behavioral theories, from court transcripts of fraudulent cases, and social
inputs? The answer to this question is yes. First, after collecting court transcripts (see
Table 11) from cases centered around fraudulent activities and documented in 138 pages
of material, each case provided unique data that was paired against Hutto and Gilbert’s
(2014) rule-based model for sentiment analysis. Second, each of the lab experiments
leveraged the Weka package AffectiveTweets. According to Bravo-Marquez et al. (2019),
the package is used to analyze sentiment found in the 20,000 social media Twitter tweets
and was instrumental in gathering AffectiveTweets scoring (see Table 10). Scores with the
lowest negative values reflect sentiment intensity, and appear to be useful when
identifying a potential threat within tweets. Third, applicable behavioral theories were
annotated by observations throughout (see Appendix Y) with correlations connecting
fraudulent behaviors to associated theories.
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Table 11
Referenced Court Documents
Court
The Superior Court of California. County of Santa Clara

Assigned case number
SC-1903821

The United States District Court, Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division

320-CR-00266

The United States District Court, Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division

320-CR-00245

The United States District Court, Northern District of
California, San Francisco Division

4-15-CV-01490

The United States District Court, Northern District of
Illinois
The United States District Court, Southern District of
California. The Southern District

3-16-CV-02600
3-16-CV-01547

Lastly, each IT artifact’s creation began with Offermann et al.’s (2009)
overarching design science research methodology to contribute to the uniform creation of
each artifact (see Table 12) through the GPFLE process as outlined in the Result’s
section. Furthermore, the IT artifact’s granular design leveraged works by Leoz and
Petter (2018) to provide social aspects, behavioral aspects, and fraud-related aspects.
Conversely, the technical component included information aspects, technology aspects,
and an IT design, supportive of the IT artifact creation.
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Table 12
Artifact Details
Artifact 1

Artifact 2

Artifact 3

Applicable
behavioral theories

1

2

2

2

2

1

Pages of court
transcripts

1

22

23

36

33

23

157

206

1846

5926

7515

3269

Negative lexicons
from tweets

Artifact 4 Artifact 5 Artifact 6
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Research Question 5 asked: Will each IT artifact yield favorable outcomes
through lab experiments and contribute to the goal of the study? All IT artifacts were
based on Offermann et al.’s (2009) DSR model and implemented Leoz and Petter’s
(2018) artifact design with the majority of lab experiments producing what appears to be
an expected outcome. The first lab experiment was limited in its data collections from
court transcripts, and the artifact did not provide a significant outcome related to negative
lexicons (see Appendix Q). However, in this instance, sufficient data did exist in order to
correlate a behavioral theory (see Appendix Y) and reveal negative sentiment. For
example, the AFINN score produced a -3.0 value and indicates the negative sentiment
within the AFINN scale. Furthermore, the NRC attributes were derived from the wordlevel emotion association lexicon for about 14,200 word types (Mohammad & Turney,
2013) and produced a low HASH-SENT-negScore of -1.244.
Other experiments contributed to the study by identifying lexicons, behavioral
theories (see Appendix Y), and sentiment scores likely associated with fraudulent tweets
(see Table 10). These sane experiments extended data collections and provided 206,
1,846, 5,926, 7,515, and 3,269 classification instances for experiments two, three, four,
five, and six. The dissertation study’s promising outcomes arrived from the review of
each set of court documents (see Table 11), established negative associations that
correlated to various tweets, effectively scored overall sentiment using AffectiveTweets
to examine social media tweet sentiment, and applied Hutto’s (2014a) negative lexicons
to demonstrate undesired conversations within tweets. Lastly, all outcomes appear
favorable to improving the preemployment vetting process.
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Implications
The study demonstrated that sentiment found in social media data could
illuminate negativity associated with different flavors of fraud. The various IT artifacts’
foundations were based on the unique cases on fraud and could be used by during the
vetting process for employees, contractors, or business associates. Moreover, these
research findings could contribute to a holistic solution to help mitigate insider threats
and contribute to the body of knowledge.
Recommendations
First, as mentioned in the study's weaknesses, future research should explore
support for additional languages and go beyond English (with permission of the author).
Verhoeven, Daelemans, and Plank (2016) collected a sample of 65,000,000 tweets and
found that Japanese, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, and French are used most frequently
after English (see Figure 45). An insignificant portion of the Twitter data in the present
study reflected tweets in other languages. For instance, out of twenty-thousand tweets,
Spanish accounted for twenty tweets, Estonian accounted for one tweet, French
accounted for two tweets, Italian accounted for three tweets, Dutch accounted for five
tweets, Portuguese accounted for three tweets, and Tagalog accounted for twelve tweets.
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Figure 45. Distribution of languages (% of Tweets). Reprinted from “Twisty: A
multilingual twitter stylometry corpus for gender and personality profiling,” by B.
Verhoeven, W. Daelemans, and B. Plank, 2016, Proceedings of the Tenth International
Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation, 1632–1637. Adapted with
permission.
Second, further expansion beyond fraud is needed to target specific forms of
white-collar crimes, as previously mentioned. Expanding to other forms of crime could
yield a wealth of data and benefit organizations’ mitigation efforts.
Furthermore, other social media tools could be leveraged. This dissertation study
did not realize many of the initial up-front and technical challenges; thus, dealt with
problematic issues in on-premises processing and analyzing data for various
technological reasons. A later discovery led to more tools with many of companies
offering trial periods, discounted pricing, and some required purchasing. However, due to
cloud privacy concerns, caution should be used when using products that are eager to
place data in cloud hosting environments. The following (see Table 13) are a list of
additional tools that were discovered during the research process:
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Table 13
Available Tools
Tool

Description

Comprehend

Amazon Comprehend is a natural language processing (NLP) service that uses
machine learning to discover insights from text (Amazon.com, 2021).

TalkWalker

AI powered analysis provides real time insights into what's happening on all
social channels and online media, across 187 languages (Talkwalker.com, 2021).

Tableau Desktop Visual analytics displays interactive dashboards help you uncover hidden
insights on the fly (Tableau.com, 2021).
DataRobot

DataRobot is the leading end-to-end enterprise AI platform that automates and
accelerates every step of your path from data to value (DataRobot.com, 2021).

RapidMiner

According to RapidMiner.com (2021), the product provides a comprehensive
data science platform to utilize automation and visual workflow design.

MLbase

According to MLbase.org (2021), MLbase is distributed machine learning
consisting of three components. MLlib, MLI, and ML Optimizer, to address
issues with implementing and consuming machine learning tasks.

BigML

BigML is a consumable, programmable, and scalable Machine Learning
platform that makes it easy to solve and automate
Classification, Regression, Time Series Forecasting, Cluster Analysis, Anomaly
Detection, Association Discovery, and Topic Modeling tasks (BigML.com,
2021).

Datawrapper

Enrich your stories with charts, maps, and tables (Datawrapper.de, 2021).

Visualr

Visualr is a Data Visualization and Analytics Platform that will help your
organization to convert raw data into insights in the form of interactive
Dashboards and Analytical Reports, from different data sources (Visualr.io,
2021), and is capable of handling data in the terabytes.

Paxata

Paxata provides a self-service data preparation solution for business and
technical teams to visually clean, integrate, and govern data at scale (Paxata.com,
2021).

Trifacta

Trifacta provides visual and intelligent guidance to accelerate data preparation so
you get to insights faster (Trifacta.com, 2021).
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Summary
The opening chapter introduced the background of insider threats through an
extensive examination of past, current, and future directions of insider threat activities.
Previous postures demonstrated a reactive stance, which often require additional
personnel and technology support (Wallace & Loffi, 2014). This dissertation study
closely explored the social media sentiments presented by Gritzalis et al. (2014), who
postulated that online content provides characteristics of individuals who demonstrate
traits of a potential insider threat.
This dissertation study applied 11 steps from a DSR methodology that led to the
creation of IT artifacts. Multiple sources of data collections, analysis, instrument
development, and validation provided the sentiment scores and negative sentiment
classifications that contributed to identifying insider threats from an earlier stage within
social media data. Similarly, research by Park et al. (2018) included social media data
and behavioral theories, which provided the foundation for this study. Such information
contributed to the relevancy of moving towards proactive measures.
Several theories were more applicable than others. For instance, the general
deterrence theory and the social bond theory did not appear to be associated with any of
the court input streams. However, the protection motivation theory, TRA, the RPB, and
the RAT appeared to be associated with the same set of cases, with the most prominent
being the RAT and the TPB. The latter two theories may have been most prominent
simply because of similarities within the court cases.
The summary of results below illustrates that all artifact Tweet analyses were
paired with negative sentiments extracted from the various forms of fraudulent court
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cases. Although this dissertation study did anticipate retrieving positive sentiments, it did
not show bias by restricting such data. Instead, focus on negative sentiments led to the
prediction of insider threats. Within the artifact Tweet analysis, all Tweet filtering
measures for each artifact are listed in columns 1–27, with the lowest negative score
representing the point of interest as shown in columns 1, 4, 20, and 25 (see Figure 46).

Figure 46. Artifact Tweet analysis.

Additionally, some instances represented extreme levels of negative sentiment
which were classified under sentiment weights, such as NRC-Hash-Sent-negScores,
SentiWordnet-negScores, and AFINN-negScores. Recognizing these types of sentiment
scores as applied to social media analysis could expose fraud-related insider threats
during preemployment vetting. The negative sentiments could provide HR with another
tool to mitigate potential threats within an organization and its business partners.
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Appendices

Appendix A:
Fix Sentiment Weights

Module FixSentimentWeights
'***********************************************************************************
'* Program: FixSentimentWeights
'*
Date: 06-09-2020
'*
By: Robert W. Jones
'* Purpose: Create a new source file from the original VADER lexicon file to correct
'*
issues with either missing weights and deleted a record at position 825
'*
that appeared to cause issues when reading. The output file has every
'*
piece of information verbatim to the master input. To correct an issue
'*
that caused WEKA to error when reading, the output from this program did
'*
require opening the new output file in NotePad, then as an ANSI file (as
'*
the original used UTF-8 encoding.
'***********************************************************************************
Sub Main()
Dim sSource As String = "" 'Source filename
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination filename
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'String record out
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in
Dim nStartPos As Byte = 0 'Numeric start position
Dim sOut As String = "" 'String out
Dim nFilePosition As Integer = 0 'Numeric file positioning
sSource = "C:\DISS901-3\vaderSentiment-master\vaderSentiment\vader_lexicon2.arff"
sDestination = "C:\DISS901-3\vaderSentiment-master\vaderSentiment\vader_lexicon_gold.arff"
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False)
Try
If System.IO.File.Exists(sSource) = True Then
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSource)
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine()
nFilePosition += 1
If nFilePosition <= 6 Then 'No changes until after record 6
file.WriteLine(sRecordIn)
Else
'After record 6, then process and make changes in destination file
nStartPos = InStr(sRecordIn, ",", CompareMethod.Text) + 1
sOut = Mid(sRecordIn, nStartPos, 4)
file.WriteLine(RTrim(sRecordIn) + ",{" + sOut + "}")
End If
Loop 'Read all VADER data that is available
Else

134
Appendix A continued:
Fix Sentiment Weights
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSource)
Exit Sub 'Unable to open the source VADER data file
End If
'Close file
file.Close()
Catch ex As Exception
MsgBox("FixSentimentWeights has encountered an error and unable to continue.")
End Try
End Sub
End Module
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Appendix B
Background on VADER lexicons

VADER was empirically validated using multiple and independent judges when
establishing the “gold-standard” with sentiment that leverages blog-like contexts.
Lexicons implements both polarity and intensity of sentiments tuned to social media.
According to C.J. Hutto (2014),
Sentiment ratings from 10 independent human raters (all pre-screened, trained,
and quality checked for optimal inter-rater reliability). Over 9,000 token features
were rated on a scale from "[–4] Extremely Negative" to "[4] Extremely Positive",
with allowance for "[0] Neutral (or Neither, N/A)". We kept every lexical feature
that had a non-zero mean rating, and whose standard deviation was less than 2.5
as determined by the aggregate of those ten independent raters. This left us with
just over 7,500 lexical features with validated valence scores that indicated both
the sentiment polarity (positive/negative), and the sentiment intensity on a scale
from –4 to +4. For example, the word "okay" has a positive valence of 0.9, "good"
is 1.9, and "great" is 3.1, whereas "horrible" is –2.5, the frowning emoticon :( is –
2.2, and "sucks" and it's slang derivative "sux" are both –1.5. Manually creating a
comprehensive sentiment lexicon is a labor intensive and sometimes error prone
process, so it is no wonder that many opinion mining researchers and practitioners
rely so heavily on existing lexicons as primary resources. We are pleased to offer
ours as a new resource. We began by constructing a list inspired by examining
existing well-established sentiment word-banks (LIWC, ANEW, and GI). We
empirically confirmed the general applicability of each feature candidate to
sentiment expressions using a wisdom-of-the-crowd (WotC) approach
(Surowiecki, 2004) to acquire a valid point estimate for the sentiment valence
(polarity & intensity) of each context-free candidate feature. (p. 1)
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Appendix C
Import Social Media into WEKA

Figure C1
WEKA Explorer
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Figure C2
Tweet ARFF File
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Figure C3
Tweet Filtering
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Figure C4
Auto-WEKA Sentiment Analysis
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Appendix D
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output

Figure D1
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output (caption 1)
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Figure D2
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output (caption 2)
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Figure D3
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output (caption 3)
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Figure D4
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output (caption 4)
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Figure D5
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output (caption 5)
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Figure D6
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output (caption 6)
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Figure D7
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output (caption 7)
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Figure D8
Illustrations of Sentiment Analysis for Input and Output (caption 8)
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Appendix E
Assign Weights To Court Lexicons

Module Module1
Sub Main()
'***********************************************************************************
'* Program: AssignWeightsToCourtLexicons
'*
Date: 06-09-2020
'*
By: Robert W. Jones and AutomateExcel.com use of modified extact_number()
'* Purpose: After PDFs are converted to Excel, then sorted and saved to TEXT,
'*
this program reads the TEXT file, and creates a new output file
'*
with the content from the input, and paired with associate sentiment
'*
weight from C.J. Hutto (2014) sentiment weights. The output should
'*
be read into WEKA, along with Twitter data and have sentiment analysis
'*
performed.
'***********************************************************************************
Dim sLexicon(7065) As String 'Array to store sentiment lexicons
Dim sWeight(7065) As String 'Array to store sentiment weights
Dim nPointer As Integer = 0 'Integer pointer
Dim sSource As String = "" 'Source filename
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination output filename
Dim sSourceSentiment As String = "" 'Source sentiment filename
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'Record out
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'Record in
Dim stemp1 As String = "" 'Temp string
Dim stemp2 As String = "" 'Temp string
Dim bFound As Boolean = False 'Booleam for finding match
Dim nCtr As Integer = 0 'Integer for processing array
Dim nFreeFile1 As Integer 'File handle
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile handle for writing
Try
'Source file was created from using iSkySoft to convert the court PDF file(s) into a text file that was
cleaned up from duplicates using Excel, and sorted in ascending order.
sSource = "C:\DISS901-3\Artifact Lab Results\CA-C1903821.TXT"
'Destination file uses the sSource and rewrites it, so the sentiments weighted value is included. If no
sentiment weight is found, a zero is assigned.
sDestination = "C:\DISS901-3\Artifact Lab Results\CA-C1903821-ReadyForWEKA.TXT"
'Source file for reading sentiment values
sSourceSentiment = "C:\DISS901-3\vaderSentiment-master\vaderSentiment\vader_lexicon_txt.txt"
'Open the VADER sentiment as sSourceSentiment (Read Only)
'Read into two dim array (for faster processing)
'Close the VADER sentiment sSourceSentiment file
nFreeFile1 = FreeFile()
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Appendix E continued:
Assign Weights To Court Lexicons
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceSentiment)
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine()
'Pull values into arrays
stemp1 = Mid$(sRecordIn, 1, InStr(1, sRecordIn, vbTab, CompareMethod.Text) - 1) 'This is working and
only pulling the sentiment.
stemp2 = Extract_Number(sRecordIn) 'This is working and only pulling weights.
sLexicon(nPointer) = stemp1
sWeight(nPointer) = stemp2
nPointer += 1
Loop
'Close sentiment file when done reading into array
FileClose(nFreeFile1)
'Open the output file for writing.
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False)
'Open the court data file as sSource (Read only)
Dim objReadersSource As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSource)
Do While objReadersSource.Peek() <> -1
bFound = False
sRecordIn = objReadersSource.ReadLine()
'Search array to find weight. If found, write to output file with new weight. If not found, write to new file
with a zero weight.
For nCtr = 0 To 7065 Step 1
If RTrim(sRecordIn) = RTrim(sLexicon(nCtr)) Then
bFound = True
Exit For 'No need to keep looking once a match is found
End If
Next
'Write whichever is needed
If bFound = True Then
file.WriteLine(RTrim(sRecordIn) & " " & sWeight(nCtr)) 'Write matched weight
Else
file.WriteLine(RTrim(sRecordIn) & " " & "0.0") 'Write zero as no match in sentiment master file (not
good/nor bad)
End If
Loop
file.Close()
Catch ex As Exception
MsgBox("AssignWeightsToCourtLexicons has encountered an error and unable to continue.")
End Try
End Sub
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Appendix E continued:
Assign Weights To Court Lexicons
Function Extract_Number(Phrase As String) As String
Dim Length_of_String As Integer
Dim Current_Pos As Integer
Dim Temp As String
Length_of_String = Len(Phrase)
Temp = ""
For Current_Pos = 1 To Length_of_String
If (Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1) = "-") Then
Temp = Temp & Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1)
End If
If (Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1) = ".") Then
Temp = Temp & Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1)
End If
If (IsNumeric(Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1))) = True Then
Temp = Temp & Mid(Phrase, Current_Pos, 1)
End If
Next Current_Pos
If Len(Temp) = 0 Then
Extract_Number = 0
Else
Extract_Number = Temp
End If
End Function
End Module
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Appendix F
Convert Twitter Tweets into Fixed Words
‘'***********************************************************************************
'* Program: ConvertTwitterToWords
'*
Date: 06-16-2020
'*
By: Robert W. Jones
'*
Purpose: Read the 20,000 tweets from the master CSV file and convert into plain text.
'*
'***********************************************************************************
'Sub Main()
Dim sSource As String = "" 'Source filename
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination filename
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'String record out
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in
Dim sOut As String = "" 'String out
Dim nCtr As Integer = 0 'For loop counter
sSource = "C:\DISS901-3\Tweets\TwitterMasterGold-CSV.csv"
sDestination = "C:\DISS901-3\Tweets\Twitter.txt"
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False)
Try
If System.IO.File.Exists(sSource) = True Then
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSource)
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine()
sOut = "" 'Reinitialize
For nCtr = 1 To Len(RTrim(sRecordIn)) Step 1
If Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) <> Space(1) Then
If Mid$(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) = "?" Then
sOut = sOut & "'" 'Convert it as it causes issues
ElseIf Mid$(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) = "." Then
sOut = sOut & " " 'Convert it as it causes issues
ElseIf Mid$(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) = "," Then
sOut = sOut & " " 'Convert it as it causes issues
ElseIf Mid$(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) = Chr(34) Then
sOut = sOut & " " 'Convert it as it causes issues
Else
sOut = sOut & Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) 'Build the word
End If Next
Loop 'Read all input records from tweet master CSV file
Else
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSource)
Exit Sub 'Unable to open the source Twitter tweets data file
End If
'Close file
file.Close()
Catch ex As Exception
MsgBox("ConvertTwitterToWords has encountered an error and unable to continue.")
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Appendix F continued:
Assign Weights To Court Lexicons
End Try
End Sub
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Appendix G
Sequencer 1

Sequencer1 reads each line from court documents(s), looks up Hutto matches and
records into a HITS file; used in later analysis by Sequencer2.
'***********************************************************************************
'* Program: Sequence1
'*
Date: 06-16-2020
'*
By: Robert W. Jones
'* Purpose: Read each line from court document(s) - referred to as CCxxxxxxx.txt, and
'*
: look-up in Hutto.txt file. If match is found, write output file as Hits.txt
'*
: with matching sentiment and weight (i.e., trouble, -1.5). If match is not
'*
: found, write to same file with a neutral zero weight (i.e., word, 0.0).
'***********************************************************************************
Dim sSourceC As String = "" 'Source filename for court document
Dim sSourceH As String = "" 'Source filename for Hutto file
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination Hits file
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'String record out
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in
Dim nStartPos As Byte = 0 'Numeric start position
Dim sOut As String = "" 'String out
Dim nFilePosition As Integer = 0 'Numeric file positioning
Dim nCtr As Integer = 0 'Used in array for loop
Dim sHuttoLexicon(7064) As String 'Hold Hutto lexicons
Dim bFound As Boolean = False 'Found a match
Dim sHuttoTemp As String 'Temp var to hold temp lexicon strings
Dim sCourtTemp As String 'Temp var to hold temp court strings
Dim nCourtRecs As Long = 0 'Represent all court records
sSourceC = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\CA-C1903821.txt"
sSourceH = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Hutto.txt"
sDestination = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Hits.txt"
'Place sentiments into an array for faster processing.
Dim objReaderH As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceH)
Do While objReaderH.Peek() <> -1 'Read entire court documents
nCtr = nCtr + 1
sRecordIn = objReaderH.ReadLine() 'Read line
sHuttoLexicon(nCtr) = sRecordIn 'Assign to array
Loop 'Read all Hutto lexicons data
objReaderH.Close()
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False)
Try
If System.IO.File.Exists(sSourceC) = True Then
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceC)
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1 'Read entire court document
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Appendix G continued:
Sequencer1 reads each line from court documents(s), looks up Hutto matches and
records into a HITS file; used in later analysis by Sequencer2.
bFound = False
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine() & Space(1) 'Helps reduce false hits (i.e., court is not scored to
courteous)
'See if match is found in Hutto array
For nCtr = 1 To 7064 Step 1
'Attempt to make each words ready for comparisons
sCourtTemp = LCase(RTrim(sRecordIn))
sHuttoTemp = LCase(RTrim(Replace(sHuttoLexicon(nCtr), vbTab, " ")))
sHuttoTemp = RTrim(Mid(sHuttoTemp, 1, InStr(1, sHuttoTemp, " ")))
'If InStr(1, LCase(sHuttoLexicon(nCtr)), LCase(RTrim(sRecordIn))) > 0 Then 'Match is found and not
empty!
If (sCourtTemp = sHuttoTemp) Then
file.WriteLine(sHuttoLexicon(nCtr))
nCourtRecs += 1
bFound = True
'Exit For 'As soon as a match is found, move on to save time.
End If
Next
'If here and no match was found, write record in Hits with a zero weight.
If bFound = False Then
file.WriteLine(sRecordIn & Space(5) & "0.0")
End If
Loop 'Read all court data
Else
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSourceC)
Exit Sub 'Unable to open the source court data file
End If
'Close file
file.Close()
MsgBox("Data saved to " & sDestination)
Catch ex As Exception
MsgBox("Sequence1 has encountered an error and unable to continue.", ex.Message)
End Try
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Appendix H
Sequencer 2
Sequencer2 reads each line from the HITS file and look-up possible hits in the Twitter
master file. Recording the tweet hits, and weights. If matches are not found, then the
lexicon is recorded with a zero weight.
'***********************************************************************************
'* Program: Sequence2
'*
Date: 06-17-2020
'*
By: Robert W. Jones
'* Purpose: Read each line from HITS and look-up possible hits in the Twitter file.
'*
: If matching tweets exists, record the lexicon and number of times
'*
: found (i.e., trouble, -1.5). If match is not found, write to same file
'*
: using a zero weight as 0.0.
‘***********************************************************************************
Dim sSourceHits As String = "" 'Source filename for HITS document
Dim sSourceTwitter As String = "" 'Source filename for Twitter file
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination Found-In-Social-Media file
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in
Dim nCtr As Long = 0 'Used in array for loop
Dim sTweetedWords(382830) As String 'Hold Twitter tweets
Dim bFound As Boolean = False 'Found a match
Dim nTweetRecs As Long = 0 'Count matching tweets
Dim sTwitterTemp As String 'Temp var to hold temp twitter strings
Dim sHITsTemp As String 'Temp var to hold temp HITS strings
Dim nCourtRecs As Long = 0 'Represent all court records
sSourceHits = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Hits.txt"
sSourceTwitter = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Twitter.txt"
sDestination = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact1-Experiment1\Found-In-Social-Media.txt"
'Place large twitter words an array for faster processing.
Dim objReaderH As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceTwitter)
Do While objReaderH.Peek() <> -1 'Read entire twitter tweets
nCtr = nCtr + 1
sRecordIn = objReaderH.ReadLine() 'Read line
sTweetedWords(nCtr) = sRecordIn 'Assign to array
Loop 'Read all Hutto lexicons data
objReaderH.Close()
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False)
'Write a header for the csv and WEKA
file.WriteLine("Tweet" & vbTab & "Sentiment-Weight" & vbTab & "Hits" & vbLf)
Try
If System.IO.File.Exists(sSourceHits) = True Then
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSourceHits)
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Appendix H continued:
Sequencer2 reads each line from the HITS file and look-up possible hits in the Twitter
master file. Recording the tweet hits, and weights. If matches are not found, then the
lexicon is recorded with a zero weight.
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1 'Read entire HITS document
bFound = False
nTweetRecs = 0
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine()
'See if match(es) are found in TWITTER file
For nCtr = 1 To 382830 Step 1
'Attempt to make each words ready for comparisons
sHITsTemp = LCase(RTrim(sRecordIn))
sHITsTemp = RTrim(Mid(sHITsTemp, 1, InStr(1, sHITsTemp, " ")))
sTwitterTemp = LCase(RTrim(sTweetedWords(nCtr)))
If (sTwitterTemp <> "") And (sHITsTemp <> "") Then 'Only records with content
If (sHITsTemp = sTwitterTemp) Then
file.WriteLine(sRecordIn)
nTweetRecs += 1
bFound = True
End If
End If
Next
'If here write records to output file, along with hits; but only if nTweetRecs <> 0.
If bFound = True Then
If nTweetRecs <> 0 Then
file.WriteLine(sRecordIn & Space(5) & "hits = " & Str(nTweetRecs))
End If
End If
Loop 'Read all HITS data
Else
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSourceHits)
Exit Sub 'Unable to open the source HITS data file
End If
'Close file
file.Close()
MsgBox("Data saved to " & sDestination)
Catch ex As Exception
MsgBox("Sequence2 has encountered an error and unable to continue.", ex.Message)
End Try
End Sub
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Appendix I
PDF-Text-ToProcessedText
PDF-Text-ToProcessedText reads each line from the iSkysoft PDF converted Text file
and writes out a new text file that includes corrections to formatting. The output is later
used by other programs.
'***********************************************************************************
'* Program: PDF-Text-ToProcessedText
'* Date: 07-04-2020
'*
By: Robert W. Jones
'* Purpose: After PDFs are converted to text with iSkysoft, this program creates a
'*
text file to be used in other programs' processing of data. The iSkysoft
'*
text is in an unformatted layout.
'***********************************************************************************
Public Class Form1
Dim sArrayOfWords(65000) As String 'Array to hold words and check for dups
Dim nArrayOfWordsCounter As Integer 'Keep track of how many words to check
Private Sub Form1_Load(sender As Object, e As EventArgs) Handles MyBase.Load
'***********************************************************************************
'* Program: PDF-Text-ToProcessedText
'* Date: 07-04-2020
'*
By: Robert W. Jones
'* Purpose: After PDFs are converted to text with iSkysoft, this program creates a
'*
text file to be used in other programs' processing of data. The iSkysoft
'*
text is in an unformatted layout.
'***********************************************************************************
Dim sSource As String = "" 'Source filename
Dim sSourceNew As String = "" 'Source from output, used as input
Dim sDestination As String = "" 'Destination filename
Dim sDestinationNoDups As String = "" 'No duplicates in final output
Dim sRecordOut As String = "" 'String record out
Dim sRecordIn As String = "" 'String record in
Dim sOut As String = "" 'String out
Dim nCtr As Integer = 0 'For loop counter
Dim nTotalWords As Integer = 0 'Record words processed
sSource = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact3-Experiment3\320-cr-00245.txt"
sDestination = "C:\DISS-Work\IT-Artifact3-Experiment3\320-cr-00245.out"
Dim file As System.IO.StreamWriter 'Outfile
file = My.Computer.FileSystem.OpenTextFileWriter(sDestination, False)
Try
If System.IO.File.Exists(sSource) = True Then
Dim objReader As New System.IO.StreamReader(sSource)
Do While objReader.Peek() <> -1
sRecordIn = objReader.ReadLine()
sOut = "" 'Reinitialize
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Appendix I continued:
PDF-Text-ToProcessedText reads each line from the iSkysoft PDF converted Text file
and writes out a new text file that includes corrections to formatting. The output is later
used by other programs.
For nCtr = 1 To Len(RTrim(sRecordIn)) Step 1
'If not a space, build the word
If Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) <> Space(1) And Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) <> "." And Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1)
<> "," Then
sOut = sOut & Mid(sRecordIn, nCtr, 1) 'This is how to build a good word.
Else
'If here, only write records that are over three characters long
If Len(RTrim(sOut)) >= 3 Then
'Track the word count for duplicate checking
If IsDuplicate(sOut) = False Then 'If word has not already been written, record it and write it.
'Track the word count for duplicate checking
nArrayOfWordsCounter = nArrayOfWordsCounter + 1
sArrayOfWords(nArrayOfWordsCounter) = sOut
file.WriteLine(sOut)
'Track the total words
nTotalWords = nTotalWords + 1
sOut = ""
End If
Else
sOut = ""
End If
End If
Next
Loop 'Read all input records from master text file
Else
MsgBox("Error opening " & sSource)
Exit Sub 'Unable to open the court data file
End If
'Write remaining buffer, then close file
file.WriteLine(sOut)
file.Close()
Catch ex As Exception
MsgBox("Convert PDF text to processed words has encountered an error and unable to continue.")
End Try
MsgBox("Converted approximately " & RTrim(Str(nTotalWords)) & " total words to text.")
End Sub
Function IsDuplicate(sWord As String) As Boolean
Dim nDupCtr As Integer
IsDuplicate = False
For nDupCtr = 1 To nArrayOfWordsCounter Step 1
If LCase(sArrayOfWords(nDupCtr)) = LCase(sWord) Then
IsDuplicate = True
Exit For
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Appendix I continued:
PDF-Text-ToProcessedText reads each line from the iSkysoft PDF converted Text file
and writes out a new text file that includes corrections to formatting. The output is later
used by other programs.
End If
Next
End Function
End Class
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Appendix J
Court Case Negative Sentiments
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Appendix K
Descriptions for Negative Sentiments
NRC-Hash-Sent-negScore – Words are annotated according to eight emotions: joy, trust,
sadness, anger, surprise, fear, anticipation, and disgust, and two polarity classes: positive
and negative. There are many words that are not as- sociated with any emotional state and
are tagged as neutral (Bravo-Marquez, Frank, & Pfahringer, 2015).
SentiWordnet-negScore – A lexical resource explicitly devised for supporting sentiment
classification and opinion mining (Baccianella, Esuli, & Sebastiani, 2010) that relates to
the highest top ten ranked negative synsets.
AFINN-negScore – Negative words scored from -1 to -5, includes slang, obscene words,
acronyms and Web jargon (Bravo-Marquez, Frank, & Pfahringer, 2015).
S140-negScore – According to Bandhakavi, Wiratunga, and Massie (2018), emotionaware polarity lexicons for Twitter Sentiment Analysis uses Twitter API, to include a
collection of 177 negative manually annotated tweets, yet includes a collection to 1.6
million sourced tweets.
While other negative sentiment attributes exist within the WEKA package
AffectiveTweets, the antecedent was the only attributes carrying the lowest values, and
remained consistent throughout all lab experiments.
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Appendix L
Random Tree Illustration from Experiment 1

The root sentiment weight has two possible initial paths. For the experiment,
values less than 0.95 are first noted. This leads to the left of the tree with possible paths
of less than -0.45 and values greater. Focus is on the left branch and leads to lexicon
weights of less than -1.85 or greater than or equal to this value. Both ending nodes carry
significance. The first being the class of felony 1/0 and complaints 3/0. This means both
nodes’ data was discovered within tweets that might correlate to fraud. This is important
at an organizational level within the preemployment vetting, just as negative scoring
carries significant value.
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Appendix M
Kappa Statistics

Kappa is widely accepted in the field of content analysis (Carletta, 1996) and is
used to assess the agreement or reliability between two observers who are performing a
test which has a categorical variable (McLintic, 2009). According to Sahoo (2013),
classifiers provide greater accuracy when Kappa statistic is greater than zero. According
to McHugh (2012), the interpretation of Cohen’s (1960) Kappa development suggests the
following Kappa results. This study’s lab experiments found the Kappa statistics in the
range for substantial, or a nearly perfect agreement ranging from 0.763 to 1.0.

0 = No agreement
0.01–0.20 = Slight agreement
0.21–0.40 = Fair agreement
0.41– 0.60 = Moderate agreement
0.61–0.80 = Substantial agreement
0.81–1.00 = Nearly a perfect agreement
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Appendix N
Dr. Stacie Petter Permission

Figure N1. Dr. Stacie Petter Permission
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Appendix O
Dr. Udo Bub Permission

Figure O1. Dr. Udo Bub Permission.
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Appendix P
Dr. Barbara Plank Permission

Figure P1. Dr. Barbara Plank Permission
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Appendix Q
Experiment 1 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
complaint (-1.2)

felony (-2.5)

TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
active

parties

TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
bold

justice

number
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Appendix R
Experiment 2 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
assets
liability (-0.8)

credits
promises

fraud (-2.8)
substantial

TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
creating

shares

TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
created
limited (-0.9)

hide (-0.7)
matter

legal
united
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Appendix S
Experiment 3 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
acceptance
credits
felony (-2.5)
imposed (-0.3)
losses (-1.7)
promises
secured
violation (-2.2)
wells

approval
determination
gains
improvement
mandatory
questioned (-0.4)
suspended (-2.1)
violence (-3.1)

assets
determined
granting
liability (-0.8)
offenses (-1.5)
recommended
victims (-1.3)
weapon (-1.2)

TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
arrested (-2.1)
entitled

conspiracy (-2.4)
error (-1.7)

engaged
victim (-1.1)

TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
ability
accepted
allow
commit
crime (-2.5)
dear
effective
fraud (-2.8)
guilty (-1.8)
interest
loss (-1.3)
number
outstanding
please
secure
special

abuse (-3.2)
accepting
approved
committed
criminal (-2.4)
death (-2.9)
fine
grant
honorable
justice
low (-1.1)
offense (-1.0)
parties
risk (-1.1)
sentence
united

accept
agreement
benefit
credit
dangerous (-2.1)
defense
fit
gross (-2.1)
injury (-1.8)
leave (-0.2)
matter
original
pay (-0.4)
safety
smart
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Appendix T
Experiment 4 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
admits
asset
benefits
commitment
complaints (-1.7)
delay (-1.3)
engaged
excluded (-1.4)
failing (-2.3)
greater
lawsuit (-0.9)
oppressive (-1.7)
questioned (-0.4)
refused (-1.2)
safety
substantial
trusting
unfair (-2.1)
violations (-2.4)

advanced
assured
cancer (-3.4)
complained (-1.7)
deceive (-1.7)
denying (-1.4)
ensure
extends
fails (-1.8)
increase
misleading (-1.7)
profits
recommended
responsible
satisfied
suffer (-2.5)
unaware (-0.8)
violate (-2.2)
warn (-0.4)

approval
awarded
charities
complaint (-1.2)
deceived (-1.9)
effectively
entitled
fail (-2.5)
faulty (-1.3)
increased
offends (-2.0)
promote
recommends
safest
saved
suffered (-2.2)
unethical (-2.3)
violation (-2.2)

TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
acceptable
award
challenges
creates
devastating (-3.3)
engaging
failed (-2.3)
guarantee
honest
injured (-1.7)
interests
limited (-0.9)
lower (-1.2)
no (-1.2)
please
punish (-2.4)
respect
safe
share

agree
care
clear
cut (-1.1)
dream
exclusive
fair
hard (-0.4)
immoral (-2.0)
injury (-1.8)
legal
lost (-1.3)
matter
parties
problems (-1.7)
refuse (-1.2)
risk (-1.1)
scare (-2.2)
significant

attacks (-1.9)
certain
committed
desire
engage
exposed (-0.3)
giving
harm (-2.5)
important
interest
lies (-1.8)
low (-1.1)
matters
party
protect
relief
risks (-1.1)
serious (-0.3)
strong
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Appendix T continued:
Experiment 4 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
superior
top
united
well

Support
trouble (-1.7)
Value
wrong (-2.1)

sure
truth
want
yes

TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
admitted
fight (-1.6)
illegal (-2.6)

Best
fraud (-2.8)
lowering (-1.0)

demand (-0.5)
growing
touted (-0.2)
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Appendix U
Experiment 5 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons

approval
benefit
challenges
deceive (-1.7)
delay (-1.3)
dispute (-1.7)
engaging
exploiting (-1.9)
grossly (-0.9)
hoax (-1.1)
inability (-1.7)
liability (-0.8)
offend (-1.2)
profits
punish (-2.4)
respective
satisfy
sophisticated
touted (-0.2)
unethical (-2.3)
value
violation (-2.2)
vision

active
avoided (-1.4)
boosted
cleaner
deceived (-1.9)
determination
disregard (-1.1)
ensure
failures (-2.0)
harmed (-2.1)
immoral (-2.0)
increased
losses (-1.7)
parties
promise
reckless (-1.7)
responsible
shared
stinky (-1.5)
trusted
unfair (-2.1)
victims (-1.3)
violations (-2.4)

actively
awarded
burdens (-1.5)
complaint (-1.2)
deception (-1.9)
determined
efficient
excluded (-1.4)
futile (-1.9)
harsh (-1.9)
improvements
innovative
misleading (-1.7)
profit
protects
relief
satisfied
sluggish (-1.7)
substantial
uncertain (-1.2)
unjust (-2.3)
violated (-2.4)
virtue

TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
ability
actively
award
burden (-1.9)
clean
confidence
created
defense
effective
escape
failure (-2.3)
fraud (-2.8)
giving

accomplish
admit
benefits
care
clear
confusion (-1.2)
creates
delay (-1.3)
engaged
exclusive
fair
free
good

active
authority
better
certain
committed
create
defeat (-2.0)
difficult (-1.5)
entitled
failed (-2.3)
fit
friendly
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Appendix U continued:
Experiment 5 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
admitted
great
negative (-2.7)

alone (-1.0)
illegal (-2.6)
pay (-0.4)

best
injury (-1.8)
successful
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Appendix V
Experiment 6 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (Zero Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
abuse (-3.2)
asset
committing
complained (-1.7)
demanded (-0.9)
determined
engaged
entitled
favors
integrity
preventing (-0.1)
promises
respectfully
substantial
threatens (-1.6)
unethical (-2.3)
violated (-2.4)

admits
assurances
compelled
complaint (-1.2)
demanding (-0.9)
disregard (-1.1)
engagement
extends
hacked (-1.7)
intellectual
profit
refused (-1.2)
restricting (-1.6)
suspected (-0.9)
threats (-1.8)
unjust (-2.3)
violation (-2.2)

admitted
avoided (-1.4)
competition
consent
destruction (-2.7)
efficient
ensuring
favor
harmed (-2.1)
merits
profits
refusing (-1.7)
secured
threatened (-2.0)
unacceptable (-2.0)
violate (-2.2)
virtue

TPR (Greater than 0 and less than 1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
advantage
benefits
failing (-2.3)
lawsuit (-0.9)
secure
threatening (-2.4)
worthy

authority
destroying (-2.6)
failure (-2.3)
protected
steal (-2.2)
united

benefit
enjoyed
greater
relief
suffered (-2.2)
valuable

TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
agree
alone (-1.0)
clear
credit
damage (-2.2)
difficult (-1.5)
failed (-2.3)
great
illegal (-2.6)

agreed
award
committed
crime (-2.5)
demand (-0.5)
easily
fraud (-2.8)
gross (-2.1)
interest

agreement
certain
created
criminal (-2.4)
destroy (-2.5)
excuse
giving
harm (-2.5)
legal
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Appendix V continued:
Experiment 6 TPR and FPR Results
TPR (1Value) Classes and Associated Negative Lexicons
lies (-1.8)
lost (-1.3)
number
party
promise
respect
steal (-2.2)
suffer (-2.5)
value

limited (-0.9)
low (-1.1)
original
please
promised
security
stop (-1.2)
Support
Well

loss (-1.3)
matter
parties
prevent
protect
share
success
threat (-2.4)
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Appendix W
Summary from Experiments
Experiment

TPR

FPR

Precision

Kappa

Classification

Theory

Negative
Lexicons

1

0.873

0.039

0.539

0.8055

Trees Random
Forest

RAT

2

2

0.550

0.009

0.999

0.8106

Trees Random
Forest

RAT /
TPB

4

3

0.948

0.003

0.958

0.9449

Discriminative
Multinomial

RAT /
TPB

30

4

0.700

0.005

0.736

0.6822

Naive Bayes

TRA /
RAT

58

5

0.780

0.004

0.995

0.7588

Naive Bayes

PMT /
RAT

48

6

0.929

0.002

0.492

0.9257

Discriminative
Multinomial

RAT

43
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Appendix X
Behavioral Theories within Lab Experiments
Experiment

Theory

1

Routine Activity Theory

2

Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Planned Behavior

3

Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Planned Behavior

4

Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Reasoned Action

5

Routine Activity Theory / Protection Motivation Theory

6

Routine Activity Theory
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Appendix Y
Behavioral Theory Correlations within Lab Experiments
Experiment

Theory

1

Routine Activity Theory

2

3

Correlation

The turn of unfortunate events shared by
D’Addona (2019) aligns with the RAT. In this
instance, the offender leveraged his tenure and
promotions through the ranks to place himself in
a position with access to financial components
within the organization. According to Cohen &
Felson’s (1979), definition of RAT. The
circumstances surrounding the embezzlement was
demonstrated through the lack of capable
guardians against criminal activities, and the
offender sought suitable targets; all in alignment
with the theory.
Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Planned Behavior After reviewing the court’s news release and
reviewing the case as filed with the courts, this
particular case appeared to align with two
behavioral theories: the RAT and the TPB. As
Cohen and Felson (1979) posited, unlawful
activities are brought together through conditions
exhibited in this case, along with investors (the
targets) and lacked protectors to these types of
criminal activities. Equally, the TPB
demonstrates the insufficiency of following any
type of behavioral control, antecedents of
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived
behavioral control that lead to predictors with
intentions and actions (Ajzen, 1991).
Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Planned Behavior Review of the court’s case appeared to align
with two behavioral theories: the RAT and the
TPB. As in the previous experiment and
applicable is Cohen and Felson’s (1979) theory
with unlawful activities coming together through
conditions exhibited in this case; along with
banks and credit unions (the targets) and lacked
protectors to these types of criminal activities.
Equally important, the TPB demonstrates the
insufficiency of following any type of behavioral
control, antecedents of attitudes, subjective
norms, and perceived behavioral control that lead
to predictors with intentions and actions (Ajzen,
1991), and appears to be demonstrated by greed.
The offenders appeared to target investors who
were all blind-eyed to activities outside of their
knowledge using an elaborate strategy of being in
control of schemes that lacked checks and
balances.
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Appendix Y continued:
Behavioral Theory Correlations within Lab Experiments
Experiment

Theory

Correlation

4

Routine Activity Theory / Theory of Reasoned
Action

5

Routine Activity Theory / Protection Motivation
Theory

6

Routine Activity Theory

The impact of Artifact 4 included both business
partners and consumers and appeared to fall
within two theories. The theory of reasoned
action (TRA) is used to reveal the meaningful
effects of attitudes and subjective norms. In this
particular case, the business appeared to follow a
subjective norm common with other business
owners’ practices. The behavior is in alignment
with Hale, Householder and Greene’s (2002)
assessment to subjective norms. Similarly, the
business specifically sought suitable targets in
the absence of guardians against crime (Cohen
& Felson, 1979) in order to carry out their
business practices and part of the routine activity
theory (RAT).
The theories that correlate best with this case
are protection motivation theory (PMT) and
routine activity theory (RAT). Protection
motivation theory represents the cognitive
processes to mediate the persuasive effects of a
fear appeal by arousing protection motivation. In
this case, it appears dwindling sales was a
motivation and according to Maddux and Rogers
(1983), the protection motivation came from
self-preservation with keeping the business
afloat. Furthermore, one could theorize the
danger felt by the manufacturer might be
construed with the fear from competitors and led
to the business finding suitable targets; the
consumer and in alignment with RAT.
Similarly with other experiments’
interpretation with behavioral theories, RAT
best applies to this case. In this instance, the
contractor appeared to knowingly select a target
thought to be incapable of defending itself,
which revealed the absence of capable guardians
against crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979).
However, what the contractor did not realize at
the time was the bank’s trade secrets on the
laptop and the willingness to prosecute based on
theft.
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